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On 1 December 2003, Trial Chamber II of the ICTR delivered its judgment on the case against Juvénal Kajelijeli, former bourgmestre (mayor) of Mukingo. In its verdict on the 11-count indictment, the Tribunal found him guilty on three counts: genocide (count 2); direct and public incitement to commit genocide (count 4); and, extermination as a crime against humanity (count 6).

He was sentenced for genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity with imprisonment for the remainder of his life, and with 15 years imprisonment for direct and public incitement to commit genocide. The sentences would be served concurrently. He was given credit of five years, five months and 25 days for time already spent in custody.

The Accused was acquitted of the following three counts: conspiracy to commit genocide (count 1); rape as a crime against humanity (count 7); and other inhumane acts of crimes against humanity (count 9). Earlier, on 13 September 2002, following a Defence motion, the Tribunal found that the Accused was not guilty of the two counts of war crimes—i.e. the charge of violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons (count 10); and causing outrages upon personal dignity (count 11). 

Following the death of Rwandan President Habyariamana in April 1994, ethnic tensions reignited the conflict in Rwanda between the Hutu and Tutsi populations.

By a decision of 17 June 2004, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda convicted Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, the former mayor of Rusumo commune, of genocide and crimes against humanity. In particular, the Trial Chamber found that Gacumbitsi had used his position of authority to meet with high ranking members within the commune and perpetuate a policy of extermination against the Tutsi population. He received weapons and distributed them to Hutus within the commune. He instigated the Hutu population to kill Tutsis and to rape Tutsi women. On appeal by the Prosecution and the Defence, the Appeals Chamber had the occasion to clarify a number of important areas of law including the law applicable to instigation and rape as a crime against humanity. The Chamber dismissed all of Gacumbitsi’s grounds of appeal but entered new convictions for murder as a crime against humanity. Gacumbitsi’s sentence was increased to life imprisonment.

In August 1995, the Croatian forces conducted a rapid offensive attack against the Krajina region of Croatia which had the purpose of removing ethnic Serbs, and make the region suitable for Croats instead. Both Gotovina and Markač were in a high military position that controlled the operation in Krajina.

Trial Chamber I found that both Gotovina and Markač had participated in a joint criminal enterprise (JCE, a mode of criminal responsibility in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal), which aimed to remove all Serbs from the Krajina region. Trial Chamber I found them guilty of crimes against humanity and war crimes; General Gotovina received a 24 year sentence, while Markač received 18 years imprisonment.

The Appeals Chamber considered that Trial Chamber I had erred in its analysis of the lawfulness of artillery attacks on four towns in Croatia. This error led the Appeals Chamber to reverse Trial Chamber I’s finding regarding the existence of a JCE to remove the Serb population from the Krajina region. This, in turn, resulted in the reversal of all convictions entered by Trial Chamber I under this mode of responsibility. Unable to enter convictions on any alternate modes of responsibility, the Appeals Chamber acquitted both Gotovina and Markač of all charges and ordered their immediate release.

After the ‘Coastal Road Massacre’ of 11 March 1978 in Israel, the injured victims of the attack and relatives of the deceased attempted to take legal action in the United States against several non-state organisations and Libya, which they considered responsible for the attack and which they considered guilty of torture.

The District Court did not assess the merits, as the Court held, most importantly, that the relevant provisions of international law did not provide the plaintiffs with the possibility to take legal action. In several parts of the opinion, the Court clearly stated its opinion that it is not up to the federal courts to judge on claims arising under international law, unless an international legal provision grants a private right to sue. A federal court should not be a substitute for an international tribunal and the judiciary should not interfere with foreign affairs and international relations, according to the Court.

Also, the Court held that too much time had passed since the attack to take the matter to court. Thus, the plaintiffs’ action was dismissed.  

When Rwandan President Habyariamana was killed on 6 April 1994, it reignited ethnic tensions in Rwanda between the Hutu and Tutsi populations, which had earlier in the same decade culminated in a bloody civil war.

Omar Serushago was the de facto leader of the civilian Interahamwe militia, one of the primary perpetrators of the crimes committed against Tutsis and moderate Hutus in the genocide of 1994. In his official capacity, Serushago led a group of militiamen in raids against Tutsis seeking refuge in parish churches, on commercial property, in bishop’s houses, and even those who were detained in the Gendarmerie station jail. Tutsis would then be summarily executed, some personally at the hands of Serushago. Having pleaded guilty to one count of genocide and three counts of crimes against humanity (assassination, extermination and torture), Serushago was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment by the Trial Chamber. By a decision of 14 February 2000, the Appeals Chamber dismissed Serushago’s arguments that the sentence against him was excessively long. The present decision contains the reasons of the Appeals Chamber for having reached this conclusion.