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In 1994, Simèon Nchamihigo was a Deputy Prosecutor in Cyangugu prefecture, Rwanda.

On 18 March 2010, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR reversed the Accused’s convictions rendered by Trial Chamber III on 24 September 2008 for genocide and murder as a crime against humanity for aiding and abetting the killing of Joséphine Mukashema, Hélène and Marie. The Appeals Chamber also quashed his conviction for genocide for instigating the killings at Shangi parish and Hanika parish. It also reversed his convictions for genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity in relation to instigating the massacre at Mibilizi parish and hospital and the massacre at Nyakanyinya school.

The Appeals Chamber affirmed Nchamihigo’s convictions for genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity for instigating killings, including those of Karangwa, Dr. Nagafizi and Ndayisaba’s family on or about 7 April 1994 and for instigating the massacre in Gihundwe sector on 14 or 15 April 1994. It also affirmed his conviction for other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity for ordering the attack on Jean de Dieu Gakwandi and for genocide and murder as a crime against humanity for instigating the killing of Father Boneza.

The Appeals Chamber reduced Nchamihigo's sentence from life imprisonment to forty years' imprisonment.

In 2007, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a claim against Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., a subsidiary of Boeing, on behalf of five individuals from Iraq, Yemen, Ethiopia, Italy and Egypt. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been victims of the CIA’s extraordinary rendition programme – covert operations whereby individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism were secretly detained, transferred all over the world by “black flights” and taken to “black sites” or secret prisons where they were tortured for years. The role of Jeppesen – a company specialised in the aviation sector, providing navigational information, crew and fleet management solutions, and other services in the sector – in this practice was, allegedly, that the company facilitated the CIA’s black flights, inter alia,by providing airports with false flight plans to conceal all information about the aircrafts.

In first instance, after the U.S. government intervened in the case on the side of Jeppesen, the claim was dismissed immediately as the California District Court found that the state secret doctrine prevented it from reviewing the case. This judgment was partly revoked in appeal when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that defendants had not properly proven that the state secret doctrine was applicable; the case was remanded for rehearing, though. Ultimately, in its 6-5 majority decision of 8 September 2010, the full bench of the Appeals Court ruled that in the current case the state secret doctrine indeed applied, concluding that ruling in the case would be impossible due to substantial information being “privileged” or non-disclosable. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claim was dismissed.

The principle of non-refoulement prohibits deportation of a person if there is a significant risk of that person being subjected to torture in the country of arrival. The principle has been repeatedly in the spotlights since 2001, as states came under increasing obligation to deny safe havens to terrorists. However, as this case proves, the principle was an issue even before September 11, 2001.

Manickavasagam Suresh fled from Sri Lanka to Canada, was granted a refugee status there, but was ultimately denied a permanent status as it was alleged that he supported the Tamil Tigers. Since Canada considered the Tamil Tigers to be a terrorist organisation, it started the procedure to deport Suresh to Sri Lanka. Suresh went to court, stating, among other things, that deportation would violate the principle of non-refoulement. The Court disagreed, stating, most importantly, that the Minister was allowed to enter into a balancing act between national security and Suresh’s individual rights. The Court did not consider the result of this balancing act to be unreasonable, given the evidence of the Tamil Tigers’ activities and Suresh role therein. Also, the Court stated that Suresh had not established ‘substantial grounds’ that he would be subjected to torture. 

Jelisić was brought before the ICTY for his role in the commission of crimes in the municipality of Brčko (Bosnia and Herzegovina) in 1992. 

Jelisić pleaded not guilty to genocide and guilty to war crimes and crimes against humanity. With respect to genocide, Trial Chamber I found him not guilty due to insufficient evidence to sustain his responsibility. For the crimes to which he pleaded guilty, Trial Chamber I sentenced him to 40 years of imprisonment. Therefore, Trial Chamber I’s acquittal of genocide was appealed by the Prosecutor, and Jelisić was allowed to respond.

The Appeals Chamber allowed the Prosecution’s first two appeals, in which it upheld the argument that Trial Chamber I erred when entered an acquittal without first hearing the Prosecution, and when applied an erroneous legal standard which led it to incorrectly assess the evidence.

The Appeals Chamber was unable to conclude that Jelisić did not possess the special intent required for genocide (the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group). However, the Appeals Chamber declined to reverse the acquittal on genocide.

The Appeals Chamber found an error in Trial Chamber I’s finding that Jelisić was guilty of two murders, when in fact he pleaded guilty to only one.

Jelisić’s sentence was affirmed.

Ranko Češić was brought before the ICTY for his role in the commission of crimes in collection centers in the municipality of Brčko (Bosnia and Herzegovina) in May 1992. On 8 October 2003, Češić pleaded guilty to charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and subsequently, the Trial Chamber entered a finding of guilt.

In order to assess the appropriate sentence for Češić, Trial Chamber I balanced the gravity of the offences, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

With respect to the gravity of the crimes, Trial Chamber I considered that the high number of murders and the violation of the moral and physical integrity of the rape victims were factors that underlined the seriousness of the committed crimes.

Trial Chamber I also found that the vulnerability of the victims, the cruelty and depravity shown during the commission of the crimes and the exacerbated humiliation of the victims were all aggravating factors. Conversely, three mitigating circumstances were accorded relevance, namely, Češić's guilty plea, cooperation with the Prosecution, and his remorse.

Češić was sentenced to 18 years of imprisonment.