Search results

During the armed conflict that took place on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Bosnian Serb forces including the Army of the Republika Srpska (RS), the police and paramilitary forces perpetrated attacks against the civilian population in the Rogatica municipality by detaining, murdering, raping and abusing persons of Muslim and Croat ethnicity. The Accused, Radisav Ljubinac, was a member of the RS living in Rogatica in 1995.

By a judgment of 25 April 2007, Section I of the War Crimes Chamber in the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina convicted the Accused of crimes against humanity and sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment for his role in the forcible transfer of civilians and their maltreatment at the Rasadnik camp in Rogatica. By the present verdict, the Appellate Panel of the War Crimes Chamber confirmed the verdict of Section I and dismissed the appeals of the Prosecutor’s Office and the Defence. It amended the verdict only so far as to reflect Section I’s failure to dismiss a charge, which the Prosecutor had dropped during the trial. 

In July 1995, the safe haven of Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina was attacked by Bosnian Serb forces resulting in the deaths of between 8 000 and 10 000 individuals. Members of the Dutch battalion who were responsible for the safeguarding of the enclave were completely overrun by the forces of General Mladic. In 2007, a civil action was filed before the District Court of The Hague by 10 women whose family members died in the genocide as well the Mothers of Srebrenica, a Dutch association representing 6 000 survivors. They are demanding compensation from the United Nations and the Kingdom of the Netherlands by alleging that both are responsible for the failure to prevent the genocide at Srebrenica.

In the present decision, the Supreme Court upheld the earlier decisions of the District Court of The Hague and the Court of Appeal of The Hague confirming that the UN enjoys absolute immunity from prosecution, even in light of the gravity of the accusations alleged by the Mothers of Srebrenica.

We often associate genocide with the act of killing members of a specific group, of which there have been many devastating examples throughout history. However, according to the Genocide Convention, other acts can also be regarded as genocide, if they are committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, specific groups. In this case, the plaintiff held that building a bridge to Hindmarsh in South Australia would impede on the culture and way-of-life of the Ngarrindjeri in such a dramatic way that it would lead to the destruction of this group. However, at that point, genocide was not a crime under Australian national law. The plaintiff therefore invoked legislation from the UK, arguing that application of this legislation was possible because of the fact that the UK preceded the current Commonwealth of Australia in governing the Australian continent and its adjacent islands. The judge did not accept this argument and reiterated that even when international law prohibits genocide, someone can only be found guilty of genocide if national legislation explicitly prohibits genocide. The claim was denied.

In 2002, with the adoption of the International Criminal Court Act 2002, genocide became a crime under Australian law.

In this case, the plaintiff held that building a bridge to Hindmarsh in South Australia would impede on the culture and way-of-life of the Ngarrindjeri in such a dramatic way that it would lead to the destruction of this group. However, at that point, genocide was not a crime under Australian national law. The plaintiff therefore invoked legislation from the UK, arguing that application of this legislation was possible because of the fact that the UK preceded the current Commonwealth of Australia in governing the Australian continent and its adjacent islands. The judge did not accept this argument and reiterated that even when international law prohibits genocide, someone can only be found guilty of genocide if national legislation explicitly prohibits genocide. The claim was denied. Sumner was unsuccessful in appealing to this judgment. The full chamber of South Australia’s Supreme Court reiterated that the interlocutory appeal to prevent the start of constructing the bridge should be denied, as there was no serious case to be tried. It did so, most importantly, because the ‘underpinning’ of the case, the allegation that building the bridge was in essence a genocidal act, was not substantiated with referral to domestic law.

We often associate genocide with the act of killing members of a specific group, of which there have been many devastating examples throughout history. However, according to the Genocide Convention, other acts can also be regarded as genocide, if they are committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, specific groups. In this case, the plaintiff had already sought (and failed to find) two interlocutory injunctions to prevent a bridge from being built to Hindmarsh in South Australia. It was held that this construction would impede on the culture and way-of-life of the Ngarrindjeri in such a dramatic way that it would lead to the destruction of this group. The judge did not agree that the construction would amount to genocide and reiterated earlier judgments that genocide was not a criminal act under Australian law. Treaties are not a direct source of law in Australia, and neither is customary international law.

In 2002, with the International Criminal Court Act 2002, genocide became a crime under Australian law.