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At the end of the Second World War, Tomoyuki Yamashita was a Commander in the Japanese Army serving in the Philippines. His troops were allegedly responsible for killing, torturing and raping thousands of civilians.

On 3 September 1945, Yamashita surrendered to the United States army. A US military commission tried him for violations of the laws of war. Yamashita was charged with having failed to perform his duties as an army commander to control the operations of his troops, thus “permitting them to commit” atrocities. He was convicted and sentenced to death by hanging.

Yamashita appealed at the US Supreme Court, because the military commission had lacked many procedural and evidential protections. The Supreme Court denied this appeal. The Supreme Court ruled that even if Yamashita did not know about the crimes committed by his subordinates, because of his position as a superior, he should have known. Yamashita was executed on 23 February 1946.

The outcome of this case has been much debated and criticised, because of the claimed lack of evidence and the ‘should have known’ criteria as described by the Supreme Court. 

What happens if a country suspects a national of another country of being involved in the murder of one of its officials? In many cases, the former country will request an extradition of the suspect. But what happens if the latter country refuses?

In this case, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, having lost one of its own at the hands of a Mexican drug cartel, took matters in its own hands and forcibly abducted one of the suspects, Humberto Alvarez—Machain. In the United States, he was indicted for participation in kidnapping and murder. The District Court established that the forcible abduction stood in the way of Alvarez-Machain’s trial in the United States. The Court of Appeals, relying on previous case law, agreed. It established that forcible abduction violated the extradition treaty between the US and Mexico. According to the Court of Appeals, this conclusion was substantiated by official Mexican protests against the abduction.

The Accused in the present case was Jean Kambanda, the former Rwandan Prime Minister. On 4 September 1998, he had pleaded guilty to genocide and crimes against humanity (murder and extermination) and Trial Chamber I of the ICTR had sentenced him to life imprisonment. He appealed against that sentence and later requested that his guilty plea be quashed and that he stand trial.

Before the Appeals Chamber, Kambanda argued that he had not been assigned the lawyer of his choice and that even when he finally did receive legal representation the assignment of the lawyer was influenced by the Prosecution. He also accused his defense counsel, Mr. Oliver Michael Inglis, of inadequate representation. In addition, he claimed that the Registry had organized his detention in facilities where he was isolated from other detainees and that he felt oppressed by these arrangements. The Prosecution pointed out that, for a while, Kambanda had refused any legal representation until the Registry told him that in the interest of justice he had to be represented by counsel. He subsequently requested the Registry, in writing, to assign Mr. Inglis as his defence counsel.

The Appeals Chamber dismissed all the grounds advanced by the Accused and upheld his sentence.

Indonesia illegally occupied East Timor from 1975 until 2002. In the course of this occupation, members of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) collaborated with local militia groups for the purposes of identifying, questioning and attacking alleged or known independence supporters.

In 1999, the Accused, Francisco dos Santos Laku, was a member of the TNI. He travelled in a convoy of cars to a militia checkpoint, with an individual in custody. The individual was then handed over to the militia members who were to question and then to kill him, on Laku’s orders.

The Special Panels for Serious Crimes convicted the Accused of murder, contrary to the criminal law applicable at the time. He was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment. Interestingly, although the Panel made findings as to the widespread and systematic nature of the crimes perpetrated by the militia, neither the indictment nor the final judgement charged the Accused with murder as a crime against humanity, a more serious offence.

Between 1931 and 1945, some 200,000 women were forced into sexual slaverty by the Japenese Army. These women, referred to as “comfort women” were recruited through forcible abductions, deception and coercion. Once captured, they were taken by the Japanese military to “comfort stations”, that is, facilities seized or built by the military near the front lines for express purpose of housing these women. Once there, the women would be repeatedly raped, tortured, beaten, mutilated and sometimes murdered. They were denied proper medical attention, shelter and nutrition.

The present lawsuit was brought by fifteen former “comfort women” against Japan on the basis of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the action on the grounds that Japan enjoyed immunity from proceedings as a sovereign State and the action did not fall within any of the exceptions to immunity enumerated in the FSIA.