696 results (ordered by relevance)
<< first
< prev
page 104 of
140
next >
last >>
Prosecutor v. Mohammed G.
Judgment, 29 Aug 2016, District Court of Rotterdam, The Netherlands
On 9 October 2015 the Dutch citizen Mohammed G. was arrested because the Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service AIVD believed he was about to travel to Syria or Iraq. This was not the first time the defendant was arrested; in an earlier judgment Mohammed G. was ordered to spend a year in a psychiatric hospital because he suffered from hallucinations that ordered him to join the jihadi armed struggle in Syria or Iraq.
In the current case, the Court held that the defendant was well aware of the things he would participate in if he were to travel to Syria or Iraq. For example, the defendant was recorded saying ‘I want to fight, I want to kill, I want to be’. The Court therefore ruled that the defendant was guilty of seeking to obtain for himself or for others the opportunity, means or information for the commission of arson and/or causing explosions and/or murder and/or manslaughter. According to the Court, the participation in the jihadi armed struggle can be qualified as those crimes. The defendant committed the crimes with terrorist intent.
A psychological report of the defendant was drawn up, which concluded that the defendant’s intelligence bordered on him being mentally handicapped. The Court concurred with these findings and concluded that the defendant was in a state of partially diminished responsibility. The Court therefore sentenced the defendant to three years imprisonment and a hospital order (TBS), to reduce the risk of recidivism.
Feres v. United States
Opinion of the Court, 4 Dec 1950, U.S. Supreme Court, United States
Ms. Feres brought a claim for compensation for the death of her husband, who was a member of the armed forces. Her husband died in a fire in the barracks at Pine Camp, New York, which was a military post of the US. Feres claimed that the US was responsible for the death because it was known or should have been known that the barracks were unsafe.
The District Court dismissed the claim. The dismissal was confirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Feres appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court upheld the dismissal because the claim was based on law, the Federal Tort Claims Act, which did not provide for compensation in case of injuries suffered by military personnel in the course of activity incident to service.
Krofan & Andea: Krofan and Andea v. Public Prosecutor
Judgment, 5 Oct 1966, Federal Court of Singapore, Singapore
In May 1961, Malaya proposed the formation of the Federation of Malaya by amalgamating Malaya, Singapore and the British colonies in Borneo (Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei). Whilst Indonesia did not initially oppose the Federation, it did following the outbreak in 1962 of revolt in Brunei by a radical Muslim movement. From 1962 until 1966, a state of armed conflict existed between Indonesia and the Federation of Malaysia (of which Singapore was part since its merger in September 1963), otherwise known as the Indonesia-Malaysian Confrontation.
It was in the context of this armed conflict that on 14 April 1965, Stanislaus Krofan and Andres Andea set foot on Singapore/Malay soil carrying explosives with the intention of setting them off. Upon apprehension, they claimed that they were members of the Indonesian Armed Forces and had been ordered by their superiors to set off the explosives in Singapore. They were convicted by the High Court in Singapore for unlawful possession of explosives in a security area.
On appeal, the Federal Court of Singapore was asked to determine the applicability of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to Singapore at the time of the offence and determine whether Krofan and Andea were entitled to protections as prisoners of war under the Convention. By its judgment of 5 October 1966, the Court assumed that the 1949 Geneva Conventions were applicable and concluded that the appellants were not entitled to protection as prisoners of war. Although members of the Indonesian Armed Forces, they had been caught in civilian clothing acting as saboteurs.
De Letier v. Chile: Isabel Morel De Letelier, et al. v. The Republic of Chile, et al.
Memorandum Opinion, 5 Nov 1980, District Court for the District of Columbia, United States
Marcos Orlando Letelier del Solar was a Chilean economist, socialist politician, diplomat and foreign minister during the presidency of the socialist President Salvador Allende. He became a refugee in the United States following the military dictatorship of General August Pinochet (1973-1990). On 21 September 1977, together with Ronni Moffitt, his American aide, they were assassinated by DINA (the Chilean secret police under Pinochet) agents after an explosive device was detonated under Orlando Letelier’s automobile.
In 1978, their relatives sued Chile and several individuals allegedly involved in the case. The District Court of Washington D.C. found that it had jurisdiction over the action and found the defendants to have killed Letelier and Moffitt while acting within the scope of their employment. The Court awarded more than $5,000,000 to the families of the two victims.
Barbie: The Prosecutor v. Klaus Barbie
Arrêt, 26 Jan 1984, Supreme Court (Criminal Law Chamber), France
Klaus Barbie was a member of the German SS and later the head of the Gestapo in Lyon, Occupied France in 1942. He was wanted by the French authorities for charges of crimes against humanity committed during World War II, during which time he earned the nickname the ‘Butcher of Lyon’ in recognition of his notorious interrogation style.
After the war, he was recruited by the Army Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States, which later helped him emigrate to Bolivia. When the French authorities became aware of his residence in Bolivia, an arrest warrant was issued. Bolivia expelled Barbie and, as he was disembarking a plane in French Guyana, he was picked up by French authorities and detained.
The present decision was his final appeal challenging the proceedings against him on the grounds that the statute of limitations for his alleged crimes had expired and that the French law of 1964 which held that there are no statutes of limitations for crimes against humanity was contrary to the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law. The Supreme Court of France (Criminal Law Chamber) rejected the appeal. It held that it was a general principle of civilised nations that crimes against humanity were not subject to statutes of limitation, meaning that an individual suspected of having committed them could be prosecuted irrespective of how long ago the alleged crimes occurred.
<< first
< prev
page 104 of
140
next >
last >>