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Miroslav Deronjić was indicted for his role in the commission of crimes in the village of Glogova (Bosnia and Herzegovina) in May 1992. The attack resulted in the deaths of Bosnian Muslims and the destruction of their properties, homes, and religious institutions. Deronjić pleaded guilty to the charge of persecution as a crime against humanity and, subsequently, Trial Chamber II found him guilty.

In order to determine the appropriate sentence, Trial Chamber II balanced the gravity of the offence, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

It held that the large number of casualties, the extensively planned attack, Deronjić's abuse of his political position, and the acceptance of a false statement suggesting safety for the Muslims of Glogova were relevant aggravating factors. Trial Chamber II concluded that the relevant mitigating circumstances were Deronjić's guilty plea, his co-operation with the Prosecution and the Tribunal, his remorse, and contribution to the prevention of massacres, such as the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995, from happening again.

Based on these factors, Trial Chamber II handed down a sentence of 10 years imprisonment.

Who can be held responsible in a Court of law for human rights violations? In this case, victims and relatives of victims of the South African apartheid regime sued several corporations for their involvement in South Africa in the period between 1948 and 1994. They were liable, the plaintiffs reasoned, because the police shot demonstrators “from cars driven by Daimler-Benz engines”, “the regime tracked the whereabouts of African individuals on IBM computers”, “the military kept its machines in working order with oil supplied by Shell”, and so forth. The main legal issue to be solved by the District Court was whether it had jurisdiction over this case under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which allows non-Americans to sue in federal Court for a violation of a small group of international norms. The District Court ruled that this case did not fall within the scope of the ATCA for several reasons. They could not be qualified as state agents carrying out illegal state actions, business activities in South Africa during the apartheid era could not be defined as a breach of the ‘law of nations’ under the ATCA and neither could aiding and abetting to an international norm violation. 

Marcelino Soares was a Village Level Commander of the Indonesian Army (TNI) during the violence that followed after East Timor’s 1999 referendum concerning its independence.  On 20 April 1999 soldiers under the command of Soares arrested three pro-independence supporters on his orders. The three prisoners, Luis Dias Soares, Rafael de Jesus and Felipe de Sousa were taken to an empty building on the orders of Marcelino Soares were they were detained, interrogated and physically abused by Soares himself and his subordinates. Luis Dias Soares died as a result of the wounds inflicted on him.

Soares was charged with murder, torture and persecution by illegal detention as crimes against humanity. The Court found that Soares was responsible for the murder of Dias Soares on the basis of command responsibility, as the death of Dias Soares resulted from his omission to control the soldiers under his command. For murder (or torture, or persecution) to be considered a crime against humanity, the act must be part of a widespread and systematic attack. The Court considered this was the case, and that Soares knew about this, as he attended TNI meetings.

The Trial Court convicted Soares, on the basis of both individual and command responsibility, for murder of one person and torture and persecution of three persons, as crimes against humanity, and sentenced him to 11 years imprisonment.

The Public Defender appealed against the conviction of the Dili District Court. The Court of Appeal examined whether an error of fact (leading to an error of law) had been committed by the Trial Court, when it acknowledged the systematic character of the attack against the civilian population contextual to the conduct of the accused, the illegality of detention of victims and the command responsibility of the accused.

The Court of Appeal found that the Trial Court had not erred in these matters and confirmed the judgment of the Trial Court.

During the Vietnam war, the United States used herbicides (including ‘Agent Orange’) in an effort to deprive the enemy of places to hide in forests and agricultural lands. In the decades after the war, reports on detrimental health effects of Agent Orange started coming out.

In this case, a Vietnamese organisation and several Vietnamese individuals did not sue the United States directly, but claimed that several chemical corporations by manufacturing the herbicides had violated national and international law. The Court rejected their claims based on national law, as under US law product liability against government contractors is barred.

Although the Court held that corporations can be held liable under international law, it also rejected the international law based claims as it did not find any international legal obligation which prohibited the US from using herbicides during the Vietnam war. The Court especially emphasised that the herbicides were not used with the specific intent to harm persons, but to ‘kill plants’. The Court held that since the use of herbicides during the Vietnam war had not been illegal, the manufacturers were not liable. The case was dismissed.

Indonesia’s invasion of Timor-Leste in 1975 marked the beginning of almost 25 years of immense atrocities and human rights abuses, resulting in the deaths of nearly one-third of the population of Timor-Leste from starvation, disease, and the use of napalm. Indonesia eventually withdrew in 1999 following international pressure; Timor-Leste achieved full independence in 2002. The Special Panels for Serious Crimes was established to prosecute persons responsible for the serious crimes committed in 1999, including genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, sexual offenses and torture.

The Accused, Barros and Mendonca, were members of the Laksaur militia, an armed group aimed at suppressing Timorese supporters of independence. The Panel convicted the Accused for two counts of murder, attempted murder and persecution carried out as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the population of East Timor, who had voted in favour of Timorese independence from Indonesia. Although neither of the Accused had carried out the acts themselves, they were liable as members of a joint criminal enterprise whose purpose was to suppress pro-independence supporters.