Search results

A Rwandan national who had lived in exile in Denmark under a false name was brought before a Danish court for committing genocide, namely heading a death squad and participating in the slaughter of 25,000 Tutsis in a Rwandan town in 1994.

The Danish Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the 1955 Genocide Act permitted Danish courts to prosecute persons accused of genocide, even where the genocide was not committed in Denmark and the Accused was not a Danish national. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of two lower courts and found that the charge of genocide in Rwanda by a Rwandan national could be raised before Danish courts indeed. The wording of the 1955 Genocide Act made genocide a criminal offense in Denmark, even if it was committed outside Denmark; moreover, Danish law did not require the accused to be a Danish national. It suffices that genocide is a crime both under Danish and Rwandan law: therefore, T. could be prosecuted before a Danish court

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) was founded in 1976 in response to the growing feeling amongst the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka during the 1960s and 1970s that they were discriminated against by the Singhalese majority. Ultimately, a comflict ensued that developed into a guerilla war opposing the LTTE to the Singhalese with the objective of attaining independence for the Tamil minority.

The present case concerns one of five ethnic Tamils, all naturalised Dutch citizens, charged by the Public Prosecutor of membership in the LTTE and having funded its activities from The Netherlands. In the course of the trial before the District Court of The Hague, the court found that the defendant was a leader of the Tamil Coordinating Committee in The Netherlands, and therefore a member of the LTTE itself. The defendant had undertaken various fundraising activities through the sale of lottery tickets, collecting donations at meetings and extorting money from Tamils living in The Netherlands. Having identified the LTTE as a criminal organisation, in line with US, Indian, EU and Canadian policy, the Court convicted the defendant of membership in and participating in the LTTE and sentenced him to 5 years’ imprisonment. 

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a Pakistani of Kuwait birth, is the self-confessed mastermind of the 9/11 attacks on the United States which claimed the lives of nearly 3000 people.

Captured in Pakistan in 2003, he has been in United States custody, most recently at Guantanamo Bay, ever since. Mohammed, along with four other 9/11 planners, were charged and tried before a United States Military Commission in 2008 until charges were dropped in 2010. Following a failed attempt to transfer the five co-defendants to new York to stand trial before a civilian federal court, they were indicted once again in February 2011. Their trial is currently underway before the Military Commission at Guantanamo Bay.

It is well accepted in international law that Heads of State, Heads of Government and ministers of Foreign Affairs enjoy immunity from prosecution by virtue of the office that they hold. This immunity extends to acts committed in an official capacity whilst in office, after they have left office. In recent years, however, this concept of functional immunity has been challenged by allegations that former government officials have committed international crimes whilst in office. In what has been hailed as a ‘landmark’ decision, the Federal Criminal Court of Switzerland considered that the former Algerian Minister of Defence, who is charged with having committed war crimes and torture whilst in office in 1992-1993, is not entitled to immunity before the Swiss courts. In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered that it would be contrary for international law to prohibit genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity as fundamental norms but then to allow for a broad interpretation of functional immunity the result of which would be that beneficiaries of this immunity would be immune from prosecution even where they allegedly committed such crimes. 

Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the U.S. military took control of the Abu Ghraib prison located near Baghdad, using it to detain criminals, enemies of the provisional government, and other persons thought to possess information regarding the anti-Coalition insurgency. The U.S. contracted with CACI International, Incorporated (with CACI Premier Technology, Incorporated, together referred to as CACI), and Titan Corporation, now L-3 Services, Incorporated (L-3), to provide civilian employees to assist the military in communicating with and interrogating the latter group of detainees. The use of these contractors has led to certain controversy, mainly because of multiple instances where they ended up torturing or unlawfully killing people. These practices led to three big law suits by groups of Iraqis who had allegedly been tortured in prisons guarded and/or maintained by private contractors: Saleh v. Titan Corp., Al-Shimari v. CACI Inc. and Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla & L-3 Inc.

The current case revolves around L-3, a U.S. company that was hired to provide civilian translators of Arabic in connection with military operations. These translators worked at, among other places, military prisons and detention facilities in Iraq, such as the Abu Ghraib prison – notorious for the torturing of detainees – just outside of Baghdad. Adel Nakhla, a US citizen from Egyptian origin, was one of the translators working for L-3 at the Abu Ghraib prison. Plaintiffs – 72 Iraqis who were arrested between July 2003 and May 2008 by coalition forces and held for periods varying from less than a month to more than four years at various military-run detention facilities in Iraq, including the Abu Ghraib prison – alleged that they were innocent and that they were eventually released from custody without being charged with any crimes. They filed a complaint before the U.S. District Court for Maryland, accusing L-3 and its employees (including Nakhla) of war crimes, torture and other (systematic) maltreatment committed against them during their custody. These abuses included beatings, hanging by the hands and feet, electrical shocks, mock executions, dragging across rough ground, threats of death and rape, sleep deprivation, abuse of the genitals, forced nudity, dousing with cold water, stress positions, sexual assault, confinement in small spaces, and sensory deprivation. They also allege that their individual mistreatment occurred as part of a larger conspiracy involving L-3 and its employees, certain members of the military, and other private contractors. L-3 and Nakhla responded with motions to dismiss, arguing that they were immune from prosecution and, relying on the political question doctrine, that the Court had no competence to hear the complaint. The Court rejected the motions on 29 June 2010, noting that the alleged behaviour violated national and international law and that defendants, who were private contractors, could not rely on the political question doctrine. The case was deferred for further review under Iraqi law.

Defendants appealed the decision to reject their motions, to which plaintiffs responded that U.S. appeals courts have no jurisdiction to rule on their appeals since the underlying case was not decided yet. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth District disagreed: it found that the current issue was of great public importance so that, since the District Court had given a final decision on defendants’ immunity, it was entitled to jurisdiction. Now that it could exercise jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals quashed the District Court’s decision in its entirety and remanded it with instructions for dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim.