Search results

Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui was charged with crimes against humanity (crimes committed on a widespread basis and directed against civilians) and war crimes (prohibited acts committed during war) that occurred during the attack against the Bogoro village on 24 February 2003. In particular, the Accused was suspected of killing, training and using children to support his military activities, destroying houses, and attacking the inhabitants of the Bogoro village. These crimes were allegedly committed by the accused together with Germain Katanga and other persons.

Regarding of the use of children, the Trial Chamber stated that these were often present in military groups in Ituri. However, it was not proven that the accused himself trained or involved children under the age of fifteen in war activities.

In addition, it was not proven that the accused was a commander of Lendu group in February 2003. Therefore, he was released. Nevertheless, regardless of the acquittal of the accused, the Trial Chamber emphasised that the acquittal does not mean that crimes were not committed on 24 February 2003 and that the victims did not suffer damages. 

The Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo case is the second judgment issued by the ICC, and its first acquittal.

We often associate genocide with the act of killing members of a specific group, of which there have been many devastating examples throughout history. However, according to the Genocide Convention, other acts can also be regarded as genocide, if they are committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, specific groups. In this case, the plaintiff had already sought (and failed to find) two interlocutory injunctions to prevent a bridge from being built to Hindmarsh in South Australia. It was held that this construction would impede on the culture and way-of-life of the Ngarrindjeri in such a dramatic way that it would lead to the destruction of this group. The judge did not agree that the construction would amount to genocide and reiterated earlier judgments that genocide was not a criminal act under Australian law. Treaties are not a direct source of law in Australia, and neither is customary international law.

In 2002, with the International Criminal Court Act 2002, genocide became a crime under Australian law.

Fofana and Kondewa were high-ranking members of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) who participated in the armed conflict in Sierra Leone on the side of the ousted government of President Kabbah. They were convicted by the Special Court for aiding and abetting the planning of war crimes by CDF forces, particularly murder, cruel treatment, burning of civilian property, collective punishment and, for Kondewa, enlisting child soldiers.

On appeal, the Appeals Chamber found that there was sufficient evidence to convict both men for crimes against humanity. However, the convictions for collective punishment and enlistment of child soldiers were overturned. At sentencing, in order to reflect the gravity of the crimes and the new conviction for crimes against humanity, the Appeals Chamber increased the sentences: Fofana’s from 6 years to 15 years, Kondewa’s from 8 years to 20 years. The Appeals Chamber refused to take into account the political motives of Fofana and Kondewa, and particularly that they were fighting for a just cause in order to restore President Kabbah to power. 

The armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from 1991 until 2002, opposed members of the Revolutionary United Front and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council to Civil Defense Forces, loyal to the ousted President Kabbah. The hostilities were characterised by brutality as civilians and peacekeepers were targeted. In particular, young women were forced to become ‘bush wives’ for rebels, and children were recruited not only to fight in the hostilities, but also as bodyguards, cooks, cleaners, and spies.

Trial Chamber I of the Special Court for Sierra Leone convicted Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, as high-ranking members of the RUF, for multiple counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. In particular, this decision was the first time that an international criminal tribunal entered convictions for forced marriage as a crime against humanity separate from sexual slavery. The Chamber also defined active participation in hostilities broadly so that the crime of using children to actively participate in the hostilities would extend to more children in different roles, for which their perpetrators could be punished.