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Anjem Choudary and Mohammed Rahman were both sentenced to 5.5 years’ imprisonment for inviting support for the Islamic State. Both men signed an oath of allegiance to the terrorist group that was published online and had broadcast a series of lectures online in which they denounced democracy and called for Muslims to support the establishment of the caliphate. In sentencing the two defendants, Justice Holroyde emphasised the seriousness of these offences, despite their indirect nature and the lack of violence directly caused, due to “the timing of [the] … communications, [the defendants’] high standing, the size of the audience [addressed] …, and the likelihood that those audiences would include impressionable persons who would be influenced by what” was said (p. 9). Upon release, both Mr. Choudary and Mr. Rahman will be subject to notification requirements for 15 years. 

In 1990, several Mexican nationals, executing an assignment from the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, abducted one of the persons suspected of involvement in the murder of a DEA official. He was eventually acquitted of all charges by an American Court and returned to Mexico. Alvarez-Machain attempted to take legal action against the Mexican nationals involved in his arrest, and against the United States. Although the Court of Appeals had confirmed both the government’s and Sosa’s liability, the Supreme Court rejected it. Regarding the government’s liability, it argued that the US could not be held responsible for actions committed abroad, even though Alvarez-Machain’s arrest had been planned in California. Regarding Sosa, the Supreme Court held that Alvarez-Machain’s arbitrary detention was not a violation of the law of nations. The latter term, according to the Supreme Court, should be defined narrowly. It considered arbitrary detention not specific enough to be within the scope of the law of nations. 

In 1990, several Mexican nationals, executing an assignment from the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, abducted one of the persons suspected of involvement in the murder of a DEA official. He was eventually acquitted of all charges by an American Court and returned to Mexico. Alvarez-Machain attempted to take legal action against the Mexican nationals involved in his arrest, and against the United States. In first instance, the Court rejected the action against the United States, but established Sosa’s liability. The three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals confirmed Sosa’s liability, establishing that his involvement in the arbitrary arrest and detention of Alvarez-Machain constituted a breach of the ‘law of nations’. Concerning the liability of the United States, the Court found that the issue was of such important nature that it remanded the question and initiated an en banc (full court) hearing to decide on it.

Akhmed Zakaev was an envoy of the Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov. Zakaev was arrested in the UK in 2002 and his extradition was requested by the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation alleged that during the First Chechen War (1994-1996), Zakaev committed murder, wounding, false imprisonment (imprisonment not made in accordance with the law), and conspiring. On 13 November 2003, the Bow Street Magistrates' Court declined to extradite Zakaev because the Court feared he would be subjected to torture and would not receive a fair trial if he would be brought back to the Russian Federation.

The case relates to eight Guantanamo detainees who challenged the determination of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) that they are “enemy combatants”. The case comprises the petitions of Haji Bismullah on the one hand, and of Huzaifa Parhat and six other men on the other.

The Court of Appeals ruled that that, in order to perform a meaningful review of the CSRT determination, it must have access to the information that was available to the CSRT as well. The Court of Appeals considered that these are the “reasonably available information in the possession of the U.S. Government”, without, however, hindering the Government’s ability to subject highly sensitive information to a protective order (meaning that the inspection of available information should be allowed to the detainees counsel with the exception of certain highly sensitive information, which will be available to the Court only).