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The accused, Dutch businessman Guus Kouwenhoven, was suspected of involvement in smuggling arms to Liberia (through his Liberian-based timber factories) during the Second Liberian Civil War - in violation of UN arms trade bans - and accomodating/complicity in the numerous war crimes that were committed with these weapons. He was taken into custody by the Dutch police in 2005, and put on trial.

Although the Court of First Instance found him guilty of arms smuggling (but quashed the war crimes charges), the Court of Appeal later found that he could not be convicted for any of the charges due to lack of evidence. The prosecution appealed and ultimately the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal had erred by not properly motivating its decision not to allow an examining judge to assess whether two anonymous witnesses - who were allegedly very close to Kouwenhoven and Charles Taylor, and therefore key to the prosecution's case - should be admitted as protected witnesses, could be provided a protected witness-status so as to testify in the case. The appeals judgment was declared null and void and the case was referred to another Court of Appeals.

The case is currently still before the Court of Appeal: due to the case being assessed anew on all facts and evidence, an enormous amount of requests relating to the admission of (new) evidence has been filed.

This is the one of the first cases in Europe in which a person was tried for attempting to travel to Syria to join the jihad. Mohammed G., a 24-year old Dutch national, made several preparations for his departure; he booked an airplane ticket from Amsterdam to Gaziantep (Turkey), he packed his suitcase and expressed his support for the jihad multiple times. The District Court of Rotterdam found Mohammed G. not guilty of preparatory acts for and/or the committing of terrorist crimes. However, it did find the defendant guilty of preparatory acts to commit murder. According to the Court, these acts had to be seen ‘within the framework of terrorism’.

The defendant suffered from a psychotic disorder, meaning that he suffered from hallucinations in which he heard a voice in his head ordering him to take action within the framework of jihad. On the basis of this fact, the Court found the defendant not criminally responsible and acquitted him. Instead, the defendant was ordered to spend a year in a psychiatric hospital.

During WWII, numerous grave crimes had been committed by several parties. One of the less known crimes relates to the Japanese army’s “comfort system”, an allegedly state-sanctioned system of mass sexual slavery and sexual violence/torture of hundreds of thousands of women and girls captured in occupied territories. Although the Japanese government has for a long time refused to acknowledge its responsibility – arguing that the “comfort women” were voluntary prostitutes – many surviving victims and supportive Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) sought relief. The current judgment is a result of their efforts: the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial of Japan's Military Sexual Slavery, in a 300+-page judgment, concluded that the “comfort system” was indeed a crime against humanity and found all ten accused, then-Emperor Hirohito and nine high-ranking military commanders and Ministers (all deceased at the time the judgment was issued), by way of their superior positions and power to end the widespread rapes, as well because of their involvement in the establishment of the system, guilty.

It should be noted that the Tribunal is not an international tribunal in the common sense, like the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia which were created on authority of the United Nations Security Council, or like the International Criminal Court which was established by a treaty between sovereign states. Instead, the Tribunal’s authority is based on a higher moral ground, being premised on the understanding that ‘“law is an instrument of civil society” that does not belong exclusively to governments whether acting alone or in conjunction with the states. Accordingly, where states fail to exercise their obligations to ensure justice, civil society can and should step in’ (para. 65).