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A Rwandan national who had lived in exile in Denmark under a false name was brought before a Danish court for committing genocide, namely heading a death squad and participating in the slaughter of 25,000 Tutsis in a Rwandan town in 1994.

The Danish Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the 1955 Genocide Act permitted Danish courts to prosecute persons accused of genocide, even where the genocide was not committed in Denmark and the Accused was not a Danish national. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of two lower courts and found that the charge of genocide in Rwanda by a Rwandan national could be raised before Danish courts indeed. The wording of the 1955 Genocide Act made genocide a criminal offense in Denmark, even if it was committed outside Denmark; moreover, Danish law did not require the accused to be a Danish national. It suffices that genocide is a crime both under Danish and Rwandan law: therefore, T. could be prosecuted before a Danish court

After the civil war in Papua New Guinea, which led to Bougainville obtaining a more autonomous position, several inhabitants of that island sued the mining company Rio Tinto, basically for its role in the war and the process leading up to it. The plaintiffs claimed that Rio Tinto’s mining activities had harmed their health and the environment, and that they had helped the Papua New Guinea government in, among other things, setting up a blockade with disastrous results for the population. They relied on the Alien Tort Claims Act, an US Act which permits aliens to present a claim in a US court when, allegedly, the law of nations has been breached. The Court stated that it had jurisdiction to hear the majority of the claims. However, it dismissed the claim in entirety, based on the political question doctrine. If the judiciary would rule on the merits of the case, the Court stated, it would judge the policy of Papua New Guinea during the civil war and thereby tread on the exclusive domain of the executive branch of the government, which has the prerogative to decide on foreign policy. The Court of Appeals overturned this judgement, as it was confident that a judicial ruling in this case would not interfere with the duties and prerogatives of the executive branch.   

Radoslav Brđanin, the president of the Crisis Staff of the Autonomous Region of Krajina (ARK) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity by Trial Chamber II for his role in the perpetration of crimes against the non-Serb population of the ARK in 1992.

The Appeals Chamber accepted Brđanin's ground of appeal with respect to alleged errors made in his conviction for torture in the trial judgment. Lacking sufficient evidence, it could not be proven that he aided and abetted the commission of this crime. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber concluded that Trial Chamber II made an error with regard to the facts of the attack on the town of Bosanska Krupa. Subsequently, Brđanin's conviction for this crime had to be reversed.

The Appeals Chamber also allowed two of the Prosecution’s grounds of appeal. It held that Trial Chamber II made errors when assessing the requirements for a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) (a mode of responsibility in the jurisprudence of the ICTY), particularly the role of the principal perpetrators within the JCE and their relation to the accused, Brđanin.

Jadranko Palija, a former member of the Serbian army, was accused of having committed war crimes against civilians and crimes against humanity during the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The indictment against him accused him of participation in 19 murders and some counts of intimidation and rape committed against Bosniak and Croatian civilians. On 28 November 2007, Palija was found guilty on all charges by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and sentenced to 28 years in prison. He appealed against his conviction, but this did not help him: on 24 April 2008, the Appellate Panel of the Court ruled that the Trial Panel had been correct in both its analysis of the facts and the application of the law. Therefore, the conviction and prison sentence were both confirmed.

In 1992, Mirsad Repak was a member of the paramilitary Croatian Defence Forces (HOS), in the Dretelj detention camp, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Repak held a middle leader position in the unit. Serbian civilians were detained in the Dretelj camp and held in inhuman conditions, suffering mistreatment and rape. Repak assisted in depriving civilian Serbs of their liberty and was also involved in the interrogation and torture of a woman detained in the camp.

In 1993, Repak fled to Norway and became a Norwegian citizen in 2001. On 8 May 2007, he was arrested in Norway and indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The case concerned the question whether the Norwegian Constitution allows the retroactive application of the legislation on war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Court observed that Article 97 of the Norwegian Constitution prohibits any retroactive application of the law unless similar legislation existed at the time of the alleged crimes. The Court ruled that prosecution was possible since the actions described in the indictment were punishable under the Criminal Code in force in 1992 (the time of the crimes). Repak was therefore found guilty of war crimes, but was acquitted for the charges of crimes against humanity, as there was no comparable legislation in 1992. Repak was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and ordered to pay damages of a total of NKO 400,000 (approximately 51,000 euro) to the families of eight Serbian victims.