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In this case, the plaintiff held that building a bridge to Hindmarsh in South Australia would impede on the culture and way-of-life of the Ngarrindjeri in such a dramatic way that it would lead to the destruction of this group. However, at that point, genocide was not a crime under Australian national law. The plaintiff therefore invoked legislation from the UK, arguing that application of this legislation was possible because of the fact that the UK preceded the current Commonwealth of Australia in governing the Australian continent and its adjacent islands. The judge did not accept this argument and reiterated that even when international law prohibits genocide, someone can only be found guilty of genocide if national legislation explicitly prohibits genocide. The claim was denied. Sumner was unsuccessful in appealing to this judgment. The full chamber of South Australia’s Supreme Court reiterated that the interlocutory appeal to prevent the start of constructing the bridge should be denied, as there was no serious case to be tried. It did so, most importantly, because the ‘underpinning’ of the case, the allegation that building the bridge was in essence a genocidal act, was not substantiated with referral to domestic law.

We often associate genocide with the act of killing members of a specific group, of which there have been many devastating examples throughout history. However, according to the Genocide Convention, other acts can also be regarded as genocide, if they are committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, specific groups. In this case, the plaintiff had already sought (and failed to find) two interlocutory injunctions to prevent a bridge from being built to Hindmarsh in South Australia. It was held that this construction would impede on the culture and way-of-life of the Ngarrindjeri in such a dramatic way that it would lead to the destruction of this group. The judge did not agree that the construction would amount to genocide and reiterated earlier judgments that genocide was not a criminal act under Australian law. Treaties are not a direct source of law in Australia, and neither is customary international law.

In 2002, with the International Criminal Court Act 2002, genocide became a crime under Australian law.

In March 2003, Phil Pritchard and Toby Olditch, peace activists, entered the bases of the Royal Air Force (RAF) and tried to disable the planes located there. They acted in an attempt to prevent a crime by the U.K. and the U.S., namely the preparation of a war against Iraq. Two other activists, Margaret Jones and Paul Milling, also entered the RAF base. All the activists were charged in the U.K. In their defence, they claimed that the actions of the U.K. and the U.S. were illegal. Their defence was rejected by the English courts because the alleged crime was a crime under international law but not under English criminal law.

The case relates to eight Guantanamo detainees who challenged the determination of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) that they are “enemy combatants”. The case comprises the petitions of Haji Bismullah on the one hand, and of Huzaifa Parhat and six other men on the other.

On 20 July 2007, the US Court of Appeals ruled that that, in order to perform a meaningful review of the CSRT determination, it must have access to the information that was available to the CSRT as well. The US Government requested a rehearing or, in the alternative, a rehearing en banc.

On 3 October 2007, the Court of Appeals denied the US Government’s request on both aspects raised by it. First, the Court of Appeals found that the scope of the record that will be reviewed must include all the Government Information. Second, the extent to which the Government may withhold information from the detainee’s counsel should not affect the burden vested upon the Government of producing the requested Government Information. 

The case relates to eight Guantanamo detainees who challenged the determination of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) that they are “enemy combatants”. The case comprises the petitions of Haji Bismullah on the one hand, and of Huzaifa Parhat and six other men on the other.

On 20 July 2007, the US Court of Appeals ruled that that, in order to perform a meaningful review of the CSRT determination, it must have access to the information that was available to the CSRT as well. The US Government requested a rehearing or, in the alternative, a rehearing en banc (before all judges of the Court). On 3 October 2007, the Court of Appeals denied the US Government’s request. Once more, the Government petitioned for a rehearing en banc.

The Court of Appeals denied the Government’s request for a rehearing en banc. The Court granted, however, the Government’s motion for a leave to file ex parte (which means legal proceedings conducted in the absence of one of the parties) and in camera (that is, legal proceedings conducted in private without the public or the press being present) declarations which can be reviewed by the judges only.