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Unmanned aerial vehicles, more commonly known as drones, are remote-controlled, unmanned planes that can be operated from anywhere in the world by pilots located thousands of miles away from the drone. Specific individuals can be targeted and fired upon from thousands of miles away.

Amidst reports that the United States Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are using drone strikes to target suspected terrorists in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen, the non-profit organisation, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a request with the US Departments of State, Defense and Justice, as well as the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act seeking access to records about the US drone program as well as its legal basis under domestic and international law. Faced with a refusal from the CIA to even confirm or deny the existence of such records, the ACLU filed a lawsuit before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The Court held, however, that the CIA’s refusal to confirm or deny the existence of such records falls within the exemptions to disclosure outlined by the Freedom of Information Act because such records pertain to national security and are protected from disclosure by the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 and the National Security Act of 1947.

The decision is presently on appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the success of the Rwandan Patriotic Front in gaining control of the country, members of the former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and the Interahamwe militia who were widely considered to be responsible for the genocide, fled to the Kivu provinces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These exiled forces organised themselves into political and military groups designed to oppose the new Rwandan government.

One of these groups was the Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) led by Ignace Murwanashyaka. The FDLR, composed of a military and a political wing, was coordinated by its Steering Committee of which the Suspect, Callixte Mbarushimana, was a member. The Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (ICC) alleges that Mbarushimana was responsible for the FDLR’s perpetration of attacks against the civilian populations in the Kivu provinces throughout 2009. The objective of these attacks, which included murder, rape, torture, mutilation and pillage, was to create a humanitarian catastrophe that would place pressure on the international community and draw attention to the FDLR’s political demands.

Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC declined to confirm the charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity against Mbarushimana thereby refusing to allow the case to continue to trial on the grounds that the Prosecution had not proved a number of key elements including the existence of a policy to attack the civilian population, and the existence of a group of persons acting with the common purpose of perpetrating crimes. Mbarushimana was subsequently released from the custody of the ICC and returned to France where he had been living since fleeing Rwanda. 

On 15 September 2011 a badly wounded insurgent was killed in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, by Alexander Blackman, then an Acting Colour Sergeant of the Royal Marines. In video evidence, Blackman appeared to be acting calmly and deliberately in removing the insurgent from possible observation, shooting the insurgent and giving instructions to his subordinates, including indicating “Obviously this doesn’t go anywhere, fellas. I’ve just broke the Geneva Convention”. On the basis of apparent premeditation, Blackman was convicted of murder by the court martial. In this appeal, however, the court considered fresh evidence (notably psychiatric evaluations carried out following the original conviction) suggesting that Blackman was incapable of making rational judgements or exercising self-control as a result of adjustment disorder and several “exceptional stressors”, including exhaustion, isolation, and perceived lack of leadership and support by his superiors. In light of the adjustment disorder and stressors, the court found the original conviction “unsafe” and substituted a finding of manslaughter in place of murder.

On 19 June 2017, Canadian citizen Ismaël Habib was the first adult found guilty of attempting to leave Canada to participate in the activities of a terrorist group. Mr. Habib had already travelled to Syria in 2013 for three months, but he was arrested and brought back to Canada as his passport had been cancelled by the Canadian authorities. Following initial suspicions, the Canadian police created an elaborate undercover operation by establishing a fictitious criminal organisation in which Mr. Habib was working. The accused was arrested in February 2016 after he confessed to a police undercover officer that he wished to leave for Syria to fight with ISIS. Even though the accused conceded that he had the primary intent of leaving Canada, there was a dispute on his reasons for doing so. While Mr. Habib argued that he wished to join his first wife and children in Syria, the prosecution contended that the defendant’s intent was to join ISIS and participate in its terrorist activities.

In 1990, several Mexican nationals, executing an assignment from the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, abducted one of the persons suspected of involvement in the murder of a DEA official. He was eventually acquitted of all charges by an American Court and returned to Mexico. Alvarez-Machain attempted to take legal action against the Mexican nationals involved in his arrest, and against the United States. Although the Court of Appeals had confirmed both the government’s and Sosa’s liability, the Supreme Court rejected it. Regarding the government’s liability, it argued that the US could not be held responsible for actions committed abroad, even though Alvarez-Machain’s arrest had been planned in California. Regarding Sosa, the Supreme Court held that Alvarez-Machain’s arbitrary detention was not a violation of the law of nations. The latter term, according to the Supreme Court, should be defined narrowly. It considered arbitrary detention not specific enough to be within the scope of the law of nations.