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In this case, the plaintiff held that building a bridge to Hindmarsh in South Australia would impede on the culture and way-of-life of the Ngarrindjeri in such a dramatic way that it would lead to the destruction of this group. However, at that point, genocide was not a crime under Australian national law. The plaintiff therefore invoked legislation from the UK, arguing that application of this legislation was possible because of the fact that the UK preceded the current Commonwealth of Australia in governing the Australian continent and its adjacent islands. The judge did not accept this argument and reiterated that even when international law prohibits genocide, someone can only be found guilty of genocide if national legislation explicitly prohibits genocide. The claim was denied. Sumner was unsuccessful in appealing to this judgment. The full chamber of South Australia’s Supreme Court reiterated that the interlocutory appeal to prevent the start of constructing the bridge should be denied, as there was no serious case to be tried. It did so, most importantly, because the ‘underpinning’ of the case, the allegation that building the bridge was in essence a genocidal act, was not substantiated with referral to domestic law.

Post-apartheid South Africa continues to be faced with the difficult question on how to deal with past human rights violations. From 1999 until 2005, the South Africa Prosecution Authority attempted to have Wouter Basson convicted. Basson was head of the secret chemical and biological warfare project during the apartheid era. He was charged with a variety of crimes, including murder, fraud and dealing drugs. After several charges were dismissed and Basson was acquitted of all other charges, the prosecutor sought permission to appeal. He mainly held that the judge should have stepped back from this case, as the prosecution had accused him of being biased.

However, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that only the defendant could appeal against factual questions and the Court considered the question of bias to be a factual question. Other reasons given by the prosecutor for appeal were dismissed as well. For example, the Court held that the prosecutor should have appealed against the dismissal of several charges at an earlier stage. 

The present case concerns a claim presented by Isabelle Coe on behalf of the Wiradjuri Kooris. The Wiradjuri people are an Aboriginal tribe who are alleged to have continously lived on and occupied the land now known as central New South Wales, in whole or in part, according to their laws, customs, traditions and practices since at least the early 18th Century. In part, the claim alleges that the Commonwealth of Australia and subsequently the State of New South Wales acquired the land illegally through acts of unprovoked and unjustified aggression including murder, acts of genocide and other crimes against humanity.

The High Court of Australia struck out the plaintiff’s claim on the ground (amongst others) that the High Court of Australia cannot exercise jurisdiction over acts of genocide (a) absent domestic legislation implementing the 1948 Genocide Convention and (b) where the defendant was not a party to the alleged acts.

Between 2004 and 2008, Italian courts had issued a number of judgments in which plaintiffs, victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the German Reich during WWII, were awarded damages against Germany.

Ultimately, in 2008, Germany filed an application instituting proceedings against Italy before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), arguing that "[i]n recent years, Italian judicial bodies have repeatedly disregarded the jurisdictional immunity of Germany as a sovereign State", thus violating international law. Italy disagreed, stating that the underlying acts were violations of jus cogens and therefore gave it the right to strip Germany from its immunity. Greece joined the proceedings as one of the Italian judgments concerned a declaration of enforcability by an Italian court of a Greek judgment that ordered Germany to pay compensation to victims of the Distomo massacre (in Greece). This declaration led to measures of constraint on German property in Italy.

The Court rejected Italy's claims and fully agreed with Germany's points. State immunity is part of customary international law, and the fact that the underlying acts (the WWII crimes) were violations of jus cogens did not deprive Germany from its jurisdictional immunity.

Importantly, though, the Court notes that while the current judgment confirms jurisdictional immunity of states, this does not in any way alter the possibility to hold individuals criminally responsible for certain acts.

In June 1944, German occupation forces in Greece massacred more than 300 inhabitants of the village of Distomo and burnt the village to the ground, as reprisal for a partisan attack on German troops. In 1995, proceedings against Germany were instituted before the Greek courts, by over 250 relatives of the victims of the massacre, claiming compensation for loss of life and property. The Court of Livadia, Greece, held Germany liable and ordered it to pay compensation to the claimants. Germany appealed to the Greek Supreme Court, on the ground that it was immune from the jurisdiction of the Greek courts, on the basis of state immunity.

The Greek Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and rejected Germany’s claim of jurisdictional immunity. The Court denied German immunity applying Article 11 of the European Convention on State Immunity, considered to correspond to customary international law. Moreover, the Court held that violation of peremptory norms would have the legal effect of implicitly waiving the jurisdictional immunity. It reasoned that torts in breach of rules of peremptory international law cannot be claimed to be acts jure imperii, concluding that Germany, by breaching jus cogens, had implicitly waived its immunity.