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This is the one of the first cases in Europe in which a person was tried for attempting to travel to Syria to join the jihad. Mohammed G., a 24-year old Dutch national, made several preparations for his departure; he booked an airplane ticket from Amsterdam to Gaziantep (Turkey), he packed his suitcase and expressed his support for the jihad multiple times. The District Court of Rotterdam found Mohammed G. not guilty of preparatory acts for and/or the committing of terrorist crimes. However, it did find the defendant guilty of preparatory acts to commit murder. According to the Court, these acts had to be seen ‘within the framework of terrorism’.

The defendant suffered from a psychotic disorder, meaning that he suffered from hallucinations in which he heard a voice in his head ordering him to take action within the framework of jihad. On the basis of this fact, the Court found the defendant not criminally responsible and acquitted him. Instead, the defendant was ordered to spend a year in a psychiatric hospital.

On 9 October 2015 the Dutch citizen Mohammed G. was arrested because the Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service AIVD believed he was about to travel to Syria or Iraq. This was not the first time the defendant was arrested; in an earlier judgment Mohammed G. was ordered to spend a year in a psychiatric hospital because he suffered from hallucinations that ordered him to join the jihadi armed struggle in Syria or Iraq.

In the current case, the Court held that the defendant was well aware of the things he would participate in if he were to travel to Syria or Iraq. For example, the defendant was recorded saying ‘I want to fight, I want to kill, I want to be’. The Court therefore ruled that the defendant was guilty of seeking to obtain for himself or for others the opportunity, means or information for the commission of arson and/or causing explosions and/or murder and/or manslaughter. According to the Court, the participation in the jihadi armed struggle can be qualified as those crimes. The defendant committed the crimes with terrorist intent.

A psychological report of the defendant was drawn up, which concluded that the defendant’s intelligence bordered on him being mentally handicapped. The Court concurred with these findings and concluded that the defendant was in a state of partially diminished responsibility. The Court therefore sentenced the defendant to three years imprisonment and a hospital order (TBS), to reduce the risk of recidivism.

Warsame, a Canadian citizen, travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan to attend Al-Qaeda training camps. On his return to Canada, he sent money to representatives of Al-Qaeda. The U.S. alleged that by attending the Al-Qaeda training camp and sending money, Warsame provided material support and resources to a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Warsame claimed that the provisions on the basis of which he was charged violated the U.S. Constitution’s right to freedom of association because it criminalized his mere association with an organization. The court rejected this claim, finding that the statute did not impose “guilt by association,” but rather guilt by conduct that amounted to providing support or resources.

The court also held the statute did not violate Warsame’s constitutional rights to due process and to a jury determination on each essential element of the offense.

Charles Zentai is an Australian citizen, who is accused of involvement in the killing of a young Jewish man, Mr Balazs, in Budapest in November 1944. The young man was not wearing his yellow star, upon which Zentai allegedly dragged him to an army post and, with others, beat him to death.

In 2005 the Republic of Hungary asked Australia to extradite Charles Zentai. In 1944, there was no offence of war crime in the Hungarian Criminal Code. Although murder was a crime in the National Code in 1944, the Republic of Hungary did not seek the accused’s surrender for prosecution for murder, but for war crime.

On 12 November 2006, the Minister determined that the accused was to be surrendered to the Republic of Hungary. A judge of the Federal Court and later on the Full Court of the Federal Court required that the accused should be released.

On 15 August 2012, the High Court determined that the Minister could not extradite the accused, because the Treaty on Extradition between Australia and the Republic of Hungary determines that extradition may only take place for a crime that was an offence in the Requesting State at the time the acts constituting it occurred.