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Milorad Pejić was born on 4 April 1969 in the village of Vukovar located in eastern Croatia. Pejić, who lived in the United Kingdom since 1999, was arrested in March 2008 at the airport in Belgrade when he wanted to bring a visit to his mother. He was charged with being involved in a horrific massacre that took place in November 1991. At that time, ethnic Croat prisoners were taken from the Vukovar hospital and subsequently brought to a pig farm in Ovčara, outside Vukovar. The prisoners were beaten, tortured and subsequently killed. Their bodies were buried in mass graves.

Saša Radak was a member of a volunteer unit of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). The War Crimes Prosecutor alleged that, in the period between 20 and 21 November 1991, together with other volunteer and as a part of a shooting platoon, Radak has treated inhumanely and executed 192 of the Croatian POWs.

Even though verdicts against Radak were entered on two occasions (2006 and 2009) and he was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment, the Supreme Court of Serbia overturned them both, in 2007 and 2013, respectively. This was due to the significant breaches of the criminal procedure and the verdicts being based on insufficiently verified factual evidences.

Vladimir Kovačević was a Commander of the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA)  during the Croatian War of Independence (1991-1995). On 6 December 1991, Kovačević allegedly ordered his troops to bombard the city of Dubrovnik. As a result, two people were killed, three others were seriously wounded, six buildings were destroyed, and 46 buildings were substantially damaged.

In February 2001, Kovačević was officially charged with violation of the laws of war (attack against civilians and civilian objects). Even though Kovačević was initially to be tried at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), he was declared mentally sick and not fit to stand trial.

In November 2006, the ICTY referred the case to the authorities of the Republic of Serbia.

On 26 July 2007, the Serbian Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor issued an indictment against Kovačević, charging him with war crimes against civilians.

In this case, the plaintiff held that building a bridge to Hindmarsh in South Australia would impede on the culture and way-of-life of the Ngarrindjeri in such a dramatic way that it would lead to the destruction of this group. However, at that point, genocide was not a crime under Australian national law. The plaintiff therefore invoked legislation from the UK, arguing that application of this legislation was possible because of the fact that the UK preceded the current Commonwealth of Australia in governing the Australian continent and its adjacent islands. The judge did not accept this argument and reiterated that even when international law prohibits genocide, someone can only be found guilty of genocide if national legislation explicitly prohibits genocide. The claim was denied. Sumner was unsuccessful in appealing to this judgment. The full chamber of South Australia’s Supreme Court reiterated that the interlocutory appeal to prevent the start of constructing the bridge should be denied, as there was no serious case to be tried. It did so, most importantly, because the ‘underpinning’ of the case, the allegation that building the bridge was in essence a genocidal act, was not substantiated with referral to domestic law.

We often associate genocide with the act of killing members of a specific group, of which there have been many devastating examples throughout history. However, according to the Genocide Convention, other acts can also be regarded as genocide, if they are committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, specific groups. In this case, the plaintiff held that building a bridge to Hindmarsh in South Australia would impede on the culture and way-of-life of the Ngarrindjeri in such a dramatic way that it would lead to the destruction of this group. However, at that point, genocide was not a crime under Australian national law. The plaintiff therefore invoked legislation from the UK, arguing that application of this legislation was possible because of the fact that the UK preceded the current Commonwealth of Australia in governing the Australian continent and its adjacent islands. The judge did not accept this argument and reiterated that even when international law prohibits genocide, someone can only be found guilty of genocide if national legislation explicitly prohibits genocide. The claim was denied.

In 2002, with the adoption of the International Criminal Court Act 2002, genocide became a crime under Australian law.