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As part of an operation to prevent attacks on Israeli citizens, the IDF Military Commander in the West Bank issued several Orders to allow the IDF to detain groups of people for periods up to 18 days without the possibility to appeal to a judge or to consult legal counsel.

The Supreme Court held that the military commander is allowed to detain persons if they are considered to be dangerous to the security, but that this authority should be balanced against the liberty of the individual. The Military Commander’s orders allowed for detainees to be held for a minimum of 12 days without judicial reviews and this was considered by the Court to be illegal. Also, the Court stated that investigations should start in an earlier phase of detention. However, the Court also stated that the IDF could prohibit a detainee for meeting with his lawyer because of security considerations. All in all, the Court struck down the disputed orders. 

As part of the operation to erect a wall in the West Bank, Israel constructed a wall around the Alfei Menashe settlement between 2002 and 2003. This wall also circumscribed five Palestinian villages, the residents of which filed a petition to have the wall removed.

The Supreme Court stated that the military commander of the West Bank had the authority to decide on the erection of a fence, but only if this is necessary for security or military considerations. Also, these security or military considerations had to be proportionate to the infringement on the rights of the Palestinians. In this case, the effects of the wall on everyday life of the residents of the Palestinian villages were so severe that alternatives should have been considered. This had not been the case, the Court stated. Therefore, it ordered the respondents to consider alternatives. 

In 2002, two human rights organisations filed a petition against Israel’s policy to eliminate alleged terrorists by targeted killings. Four years later, the Supreme Court provided a judgment. It acknowledged that Israel is engaged in an armed conflict with terrorist organisations and that therefore, the laws of war should apply. Terrorists, the Court reasoned, are neither combatants nor civilians in the legal sense. The Supreme Court therefore qualified the alleged terrorists as ‘non-legal combatants’. This does not mean, however, that killing these non-legal combatants is always legal. Nor is this always illegal. The Court establishes a framework with four conditions which have to be applied on a case-to-case basis to determine the (il)legality of a targeted killing. The Court reasoned that a targeted killing is only legal if the decision to kill is 1) based on reliable evidence, 2) if there are no other choices to alleviate the danger to Israel’s national security, 3) if the attack is followed by a thorough investigation and 4) if harm to innocent bystanders is limited to the absolute minimum.

The armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo opposed numerous tribes of different ethnicities in their struggle to gain power and territory, particularly over the Ituri province in the north-eastern part of the DRC, an area rich in natural resources such as gold and diamonds. One such group, the Union Patriotique des Congolais, was established in 2000 and appointed Lubanga as its chairman. He was also the commander in chief of the armed wing of the UPC, the Front Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo. This armed group was well known for its use of young children to participate in the hostilities, from fighting, to cooking, cleaning, spying, and being used as sexual slaves.

Lubanga was convicted by Trial Chamber I in the International Criminal Court’s first verdict for the war crime of conscripting, enlisting or using children under the age of 15 to actively participate in hostilities. He was sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment on 10 July 2012, with credit for the 6+ years he had spent in detention in the Netherlands during his trial. In determining the appropriate sentence, the Court assessed the gravity of the crimes by considering the age and particular vulnerability of the victims. However, it also considered that Lubanga’s cooperation with the Court and respectful attitude even despite the Prosecution’s conduct merited mitigation.