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On 14 February 2005, a bomb in downtown Beirut exploded, killing 22 people, including the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafik Hariri. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon was established by the Security Council in order to prosecute persons responsible for the bombing.

In its interlocutory decision, the Appeals Chamber interpreted the STL Statute to require application of substantive Lebanese law as applied by Lebanese courts, but not before noting that binding international obligations, including customary international law, should inform any such interpretation. The Appeals Chamber held, inter alia, that not only does a customary rule exists between states to suppress terrorist act, but that terrorism is an individual international crime under customary law.

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon Appeals Chamber examined state practice and binding international covenants to assert that the crime of terrorism is “commonly accepted at the international level.” As such, the Chamber derived the key components in formulating a general definition of terrorism: (1) the perpetration of a criminal act; (2) the intent to spread fear among the population or coerce a national or international authority to take some action; (3) and the act involves a transnational element.  For the first time, a tribunal of international character has established the existence of a customary rule of international law recognizing an international crime of terrorism in times of peace.

In August 1995, the Croatian forces conducted a rapid offensive attack against the Krajina region of Croatia which had the purpose of removing ethnic Serbs, and make the region suitable for Croats instead. Both Gotovina and Markač were in a high military position that controlled the operation in Krajina.

Trial Chamber I found that both Gotovina and Markač had participated in a joint criminal enterprise (JCE, a mode of criminal responsibility in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal), which aimed to remove all Serbs from the Krajina region. Trial Chamber I found them guilty of crimes against humanity and war crimes; General Gotovina received a 24 year sentence, while Markač received 18 years imprisonment.

The Appeals Chamber considered that Trial Chamber I had erred in its analysis of the lawfulness of artillery attacks on four towns in Croatia. This error led the Appeals Chamber to reverse Trial Chamber I’s finding regarding the existence of a JCE to remove the Serb population from the Krajina region. This, in turn, resulted in the reversal of all convictions entered by Trial Chamber I under this mode of responsibility. Unable to enter convictions on any alternate modes of responsibility, the Appeals Chamber acquitted both Gotovina and Markač of all charges and ordered their immediate release.

Case 002/01 concerns the charges of crimes against humanity against Khieu Samphan, former Head of State of Democratic Kampuchea and Nuon Chea, former Deputy Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, committed during the forced evacuation of Cambodians to labour camps and for the executions that occurred at Tuol Po Chrey. On 7 August 2014, the Trial Chamber found both accused guilty and sentenced them to life imprisonment. Both the Prosecution and Defence appealed the decision. 

The Supreme Court Chamber on 23 November 2016 issued an appeals judgement reversing some of the convictions and affirming the rest. At issue in the appeal was whether the Trial Chamber correctly defined the elements of the murder and extermination crimes against humanity. The Supreme Court Chamber affirmed the murder definition and charges, while finding that extermination requires that the accused had the direct intent to kill on a large scale. Under this definition, the Chamber reversed the convictions for the crime of extermination. The Chamber found insufficient evidence to support convictions as there were too few witnesses to support key facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Even with this reversal, the Supreme Court Chamber affirmed the life imprisonment sentences of both accused.

In June 1944, German occupation forces in Greece massacred more than 300 inhabitants of the village of Distomo and burnt the village to the ground, as reprisal for a partisan attack on German troops. In 1995, proceedings against Germany were instituted before the Greek courts, by over 250 relatives of the victims of the massacre, claiming compensation for loss of life and property. The Court of Livadia, Greece, held Germany liable and ordered it to pay compensation to the claimants. Germany appealed to the Greek Supreme Court, on the ground that it was immune from the jurisdiction of the Greek courts, on the basis of state immunity.

The Greek Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and rejected Germany’s claim of jurisdictional immunity. The Court denied German immunity applying Article 11 of the European Convention on State Immunity, considered to correspond to customary international law. Moreover, the Court held that violation of peremptory norms would have the legal effect of implicitly waiving the jurisdictional immunity. It reasoned that torts in breach of rules of peremptory international law cannot be claimed to be acts jure imperii, concluding that Germany, by breaching jus cogens, had implicitly waived its immunity.

During the Vietnam war, the United States used herbicides (including ‘Agent Orange’) in an effort to deprive the enemy of places to hide in forests and agricultural lands. In the decades after the war, reports on detrimental health effects of Agent Orange started coming out.

In this case, a Vietnamese organisation and several Vietnamese individuals did not sue the United States directly, but claimed that several chemical corporations by manufacturing the herbicides had violated national and international law. The Court rejected their claims based on national law, as under US law product liability against government contractors is barred.

Although the Court held that corporations can be held liable under international law, it also rejected the international law based claims as it did not find any international legal obligation which prohibited the US from using herbicides during the Vietnam war. The Court especially emphasised that the herbicides were not used with the specific intent to harm persons, but to ‘kill plants’. The Court held that since the use of herbicides during the Vietnam war had not been illegal, the manufacturers were not liable. The case was dismissed.