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In 2007, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a claim against Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., a subsidiary of Boeing, on behalf of five individuals from Iraq, Yemen, Ethiopia, Italy and Egypt. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been victims of the CIA’s extraordinary rendition programme – covert operations whereby individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism were secretly detained, transferred all over the world by “black flights” and taken to “black sites” or secret prisons where they were tortured for years. The role of Jeppesen – a company specialised in the aviation sector, providing navigational information, crew and fleet management solutions, and other services in the sector – in this practice was, allegedly, that the company facilitated the CIA’s black flights, inter alia,by providing airports with false flight plans to conceal all information about the aircrafts.

In first instance, after the U.S. government intervened in the case on the side of Jeppesen, the claim was dismissed immediately as the California District Court found that the state secret doctrine prevented it from reviewing the case. This judgment was partly revoked in appeal when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that defendants had not properly proven that the state secret doctrine was applicable; the case was remanded for rehearing, though. Ultimately, in its 6-5 majority decision of 8 September 2010, the full bench of the Appeals Court ruled that in the current case the state secret doctrine indeed applied, concluding that ruling in the case would be impossible due to substantial information being “privileged” or non-disclosable. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claim was dismissed.

Article 22 of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon permits the Tribunal to conduct trials in the absence of the accused, in absentia, if the accused has expressly waived his right to be present, has absconded, or cannot be found. Before a trial in absentia may proceed, however, all reasonable steps must be taken to secure the accused’s appearance before the Tribunal. In this decision, the Trial Chamber determined that all four of the accused had absconded or otherwise could not be found after Lebanese authorities employed numerous efforts to apprehend them in light of a several months long, comprehensive, and permeating media coverage of the indictment notifying the accused of the charges against them and their rights to participate in the trial. Thus, the Trial Chamber found that all reasonable steps had been taken to secure the presence of the accused, held that all four of the accused had absconded or otherwise could not be found, and ordered the trial to proceed in absentia.

Charles Zentai is an Australian citizen, who is accused of involvement in the killing of a young Jewish man, Mr Balazs, in Budapest in November 1944. The young man was not wearing his yellow star, upon which Zentai allegedly dragged him to an army post and, with others, beat him to death.

In 2005 the Republic of Hungary asked Australia to extradite Charles Zentai. In 1944, there was no offence of war crime in the Hungarian Criminal Code. Although murder was a crime in the National Code in 1944, the Republic of Hungary did not seek the accused’s surrender for prosecution for murder, but for war crime.

On 12 November 2006, the Minister determined that the accused was to be surrendered to the Republic of Hungary. A judge of the Federal Court and later on the Full Court of the Federal Court required that the accused should be released.

On 15 August 2012, the High Court determined that the Minister could not extradite the accused, because the Treaty on Extradition between Australia and the Republic of Hungary determines that extradition may only take place for a crime that was an offence in the Requesting State at the time the acts constituting it occurred. 

The appellant is a former soldier of Dutchbat III, a battalion which was part of the United Nations peacekeeping mission that was charged with the protection of civilians in the Bosnian Muslim enclave of Srebrenica. The appellant claimed that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) after being confronted with the atrocities  against the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica and experiencing the explosion of a nearby mortar shell. He brought a complaint against the Dutch Minister of Defence and requested compensation for not receiving the necessary care after the mission.

On 1 November 2005, the District Court of The Hague held that the Minister of Defence failed to provide the necessary aftercare for his soldiers after the fall of Srebrenica and upon their return to the Netherlands.

On 25 March 2013, the Administrative High Court of the Netherlands ruled that necessary care was provided during the mission in Srebrenica because the soldiers were trained and equipped. However, the Court affirmed that the Dutch Minister of Defence failed to provide necessary care for his soldiers after they returned home. As a result, the Court found that the Minister could be held liable for the PTSD of the soldier which he developed after the mission.

On 15 September 2011, while on patrol in the Helmand Province in Afghanistan, UK Marines Sergeant Alexander Blackman and his men were on patrol. They found a Taliban insurgent who had been seriously wounded (lawfully) by an Apache helicopter, and as such formed no longer a threat. After removing his AK47, magazines and a grenade, Blackman caused him to be moved to a place where you wanted to be out of sight of his operational headquarters at Shazad so that "PGSS can’t see what we’re doing to him". He ordered those of his men giving some first aid to stop, and when he was sure headquarters could not see him, he discharged a 9mm round into his chest from close range. He then told his patrol to remain silent about what happened, saying that he had just broken the Geneva Convention.

Taking into consideration Blackman's superior position as sergeant (under command of the patrol) and the consequences his acts could have for other British soldiers - namely possible reprisals - the Court found Blackman guilty of murder in violation of the laws of war (a war crime). He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a possibility for parole after ten years, stripped of his ranks and dismissed from service with disgrace.