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Adnan Farhan Abdul Latif, a Yemeni national, was arrested in Pakistan together with other Yemeni citizens as part of a dragnet seizure of Yemeni nationals in 2001 and 2002. They were transferred to the United States Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay (Cuba) in January 2002. In 2004, the Petitioners filed for writs of habeas corpus (a legal action requiring a court to determine the legality of the detention of an arrested person).

After partially rejecting a motion to dismiss submitted by the government of the United States, the District Court stayed the proceedings in order to give the possibility to the Petitioners to appeal the decision. In the meantime, the Petitioners filed for a preliminary injunction (which is a court order requiring a party to do or refrain from doing certain acts), requiring the US government to provide a 30 days’ notice of any intention to remove the Petitioners from the Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay (Cuba).

The District Court granted the motion, after being satisfied that a four-part test was fulfilled. This test required the Court to balance four relevant factors, namely: (a) the irreparable injury to the Petitioners in the absence of the injunction; (b) the likelihood of success of the habeas corpus motion; (c) the harm to the US government; and (d) the public interest.

The District Court ruled that the US government must give the lawyers of the detainees 30 days’ notice before transferring a detainee from Guantánamo Bay to the custody of foreign governments in order to allow the transfer to be challenged. 

The case arose as a result of three brutal firearm attacks upon unarmed protesters and innocent citizens in Nigeria between May 1998 and January 1999. The plaintiffs allege that in each instance, the Chevron Corporation acted in concert with the Nigerian military and police to plan, order and execute the attacks including through the participation of Chevron security personnel and equipment, the payment of funds to the military and police, and the purchase of equipment and materials including ammunition. The plaintiffs were either summarily executed, seriously injured, burned in a fire set during the attack or tortured by the military and police thereafter. Such acts were intended to force the plaintiffs to cease their protests against Chevron’s damage to the lands and the plaintiffs’ livelihood and discourage any further behaviour.

Adnan Farhan Abdul Latif, a Yemeni national, was arrested in Pakistan together with other Yemeni citizens as part of a dragnet seizure of Yemeni nationals in 2001 and 2002. They were transferred to the United States Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay (Cuba) in January 2002. In 2004, the men filed for writs of habeas corpus (a legal action requiring a court to determine the legality of the detention of an arrested person).

After partially rejecting a motion to dismiss submitted by the Government of the United States, the District Court stayed the proceedings in order to give the possibility to the Petitioners to appeal the decision. In the meantime, the Petitioners filed for a preliminary injunction (which is a court order requiring a party to do or refrain from doing certain acts), requiring the US Government to provide a 30 days’ notice of any intention to remove the Petitioners from the Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay (Cuba). The District Court granted the motion.

In the present decision of 21 July 2010, the US District Court for Columbia ordered the release of Latif for lack of evidence. According to Judge Henry Kennedy, the US government failed to meet the evidence standard to prove that Latif was part of a terrorist organisation, concluding that his continued detention was unlawful. The case is the first time that the standard laid out in Bensayah v. Obama et al. has been applied concerning the requirement for the government to demonstrate evidence that an enemy combatant is “part of” a terrorist organisation.

The case arose as a result of three brutal firearm attacks upon unarmed protesters and innocent citizens in Nigeria between May 1998 and January 1999. The plaintiffs allege that in each instance, the Chevron Corporation acted in concert with the Nigerian military and police to plan, order and execute the attacks including through the participation of Chevron security personnel and equipment, the payment of funds to the military and police, and the purchase of equipment and materials including ammunition. The plaintiffs were either summarily executed, seriously injured, burned in a fire set during the attack or tortured by the military and police thereafter. Such acts were intended to force the plaintiffs to cease their protests against Chevron’s damage to the lands and the plaintiffs’ livelihood and discourage any further behaviour.

The first case of its kind to be decided by a jury trial, Bowoto v. Chevron Corporation was decided in favour of Chevron, clearing them of all liability. The present decision is an appeal by the plaintiffs, which was ultimately unsuccessful as the Court of Appeals upheld the judgement of the District Court. 

The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited was involved in extracting and development of oil in the Ogoni region of Nigeria. Concerned over the devastating environmental impact that Shell’s activities were having on the region, a group of individuals known collectively as the Ogoni Nine, protested against Shell’s activities. The Ogoni Nine were detained by the Nigerian military junta on spurious charges, held without charge, tortured and hanged following a sham trial before a Special Tribunal in November 1995.

The present dispute is a class action filed by 12 Nigerian individuals, now US residents, seeking compensation from Shell for having aided and abetted the Nigerian government to summarily execute the activists in an effort to suppress protests against Shell’s oil operations. Specifically, they allege that Shell bribed and tampered with witnesses and paid Nigerian security forces that attacked Ogoni villages. In 2006, the District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the charges against the defendants for extrajudicial killing and violations of the right to life, security and association. On appeal by both parties, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Alien Tort Statute does not provide jurisdiction over claims for violations of international law committed by corporations and not individual persons. Accordingly, the suit against the defendants could not continue and all charges are to be dismissed.