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Ali Mahmud Ali Shafi et al. v. Palestinian Authority and Palestinian Liberation Organization

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 14 Jun 2011, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, United States

Ali Mahmud Ali Shafi is a Palestinian national who was spying for Israel until he moved to Israel in 1994. On his return to Palestine in 2001, he was arrested by Palestinian Authority (PA) security officers and subsequently brought to a PA security building where he was detained for several months. During that period, he was severely beaten, left without any clothes, and was not permitted to take a bath. In 2002, Ali Shafi was forced to sign a confession which was used as the basis for his conviction of killing the Palestinian leader Raed al Karmi and for spying for Israel. He was sentenced to death. However, in March 2002, Ali Shafi escaped.

In 2009, Ali Shafi brought a claim in the District Court for the District of Columbia against the PA and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The District Court dismissed the complaint. On 14 June 2011, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit confirmed the decision because claims can only be brought under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) against state actors. The defendants in this case were no state actors and therefore appellants failed to state a claim within the jurisdiction conferred by the ATS.


John Doe v. Exxon Mobil: John Doe et al. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation et al.

Decision, 8 Jul 2011, United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, United States

Several villagers from Aceh, Indonesia, filed a civil suit against oil and gas company Exxon Mobil. They argued that the company carried responsibility for human rights violations committed by Indonesian security forces by hiring these forces and because Exxon Mobil knew or should have known that human rights violations were being committed.

In an appeal against two previous rulings in this case, plaintiffs held that they should be allowed to sue Exxon for violations of the law of nations and for violations of state law. The question whether they were allowed to sue for violations of the law of nations hinged primarily on whether corporations can be sued for these violations and whether it is possible to sue for aiding-and-abetting international crimes. These questions were for the most part answered in the affirmative. The question whether they were allowed to sue for violations of state law hinged primarily on the question whether non-resident aliens could even bring a case before the Court. The Court stated that there was no absolute bar for non-residents aliens to sue and that this question had to be answered case-by-case. The Court of Appeals referred the case back to the District Court for further assessment.      


Lubanga: The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo

Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Public), 14 Mar 2012, International Criminal Court (Trial Chamber I), The Netherlands

The armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo opposed numerous tribes of different ethnicities in their struggle to gain power and territory, particularly over the Ituri provence in the north-eastern part of the DRC, an area rich in natural resources such as gold and diamonds. One such group, the Union Patriotique des Congolais, was established in 2000 and appointed as its chairman, the Accused, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. He was also the commander in chief of the armed wing of the UPC, the Front Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo. This armed group was well-known for its use of young children to participate in the hostilities, from fighting, to cooking, cleaning, spying, and being used as sexual slaves.

Trial Chamber I, in the International Criminal Court’s first verdict, convicted Thomas Lubanga of the offense of conscripting, enlisting or using children to actively participate in hostilities. In defining active participation, the Chamber adopted a broad definition so as to include children involved even indirectly, so long as their contribution placed them in real danger as a potential target. Unfortunately, the Chamber did not discuss whether sexual violence against these children also fell within the scope of the offense.


Gotovina & Markač: Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač

Judgement, 16 Nov 2012, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamber, The Netherlands

In August 1995, the Croatian forces conducted a rapid offensive attack against the Krajina region of Croatia which had the purpose of removing ethnic Serbs, and make the region suitable for Croats instead. Both Gotovina and Markač were in a high military position that controlled the operation in Krajina.

Trial Chamber I found that both Gotovina and Markač had participated in a joint criminal enterprise (JCE, a mode of criminal responsibility in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal), which aimed to remove all Serbs from the Krajina region. Trial Chamber I found them guilty of crimes against humanity and war crimes; General Gotovina received a 24 year sentence, while Markač received 18 years imprisonment.

The Appeals Chamber considered that Trial Chamber I had erred in its analysis of the lawfulness of artillery attacks on four towns in Croatia. This error led the Appeals Chamber to reverse Trial Chamber I’s finding regarding the existence of a JCE to remove the Serb population from the Krajina region. This, in turn, resulted in the reversal of all convictions entered by Trial Chamber I under this mode of responsibility. Unable to enter convictions on any alternate modes of responsibility, the Appeals Chamber acquitted both Gotovina and Markač of all charges and ordered their immediate release.


Ngudjolo: The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo

Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 18 Dec 2012, International Criminal Court (Trial Chamber II), The Netherlands

Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui was charged with crimes against humanity (crimes committed on a widespread basis and directed against civilians) and war crimes (prohibited acts committed during war) that occurred during the attack against the Bogoro village on 24 February 2003. In particular, the Accused was suspected of killing, training and using children to support his military activities, destroying houses, and attacking the inhabitants of the Bogoro village. These crimes were allegedly committed by the accused together with Germain Katanga and other persons.

Regarding of the use of children, the Trial Chamber stated that these were often present in military groups in Ituri. However, it was not proven that the accused himself trained or involved children under the age of fifteen in war activities.

In addition, it was not proven that the accused was a commander of Lendu group in February 2003. Therefore, he was released. Nevertheless, regardless of the acquittal of the accused, the Trial Chamber emphasised that the acquittal does not mean that crimes were not committed on 24 February 2003 and that the victims did not suffer damages. 

The Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo case is the second judgment issued by the ICC, and its first acquittal.


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