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Who can be held responsible in a Court of law for human rights violations? In this case, victims and relatives of victims of the South African apartheid regime sued several corporations for their involvement in South Africa in the period between 1948 and 1994. They were liable, the plaintiffs reasoned, because the police shot demonstrators “from cars driven by Daimler-Benz engines”, “the regime tracked the whereabouts of African individuals on IBM computers”, “the military kept its machines in working order with oil supplied by Shell”, and so forth. The main legal issue to be solved by the District Court was whether it had jurisdiction over this case under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which allows non-Americans to sue in federal Court for a violation of a small group of international norms. The District Court ruled that this case did not fall within the scope of the ATCA for several reasons. They could not be qualified as state agents carrying out illegal state actions, business activities in South Africa during the apartheid era could not be defined as a breach of the ‘law of nations’ under the ATCA and neither could aiding and abetting to an international norm violation. 

Frans van Anraat was a Dutch businessman who, from 1984 until 1988, purchased large quantities of the chemical thiodiglycol from the United States and Japan. This chemical was then sold, through a number of different companies located in different countries, to Saddam Hussein’s government of Iraq. After 1984, Van Anraat was the government’s sole supplier of the chemical. The chemical is a key component in the manufacture of mustard gas and was in fact used for this purpose by Hussein’s government who then proceeded to employ the gas in attacks against Iranian military and civilians in the Iran-Iraq war and against the Kurdish population in northern Iraq. The effect was devastating, thousands of individuals were killed and many thousands more were injured with long-term effects including blindness and cancer.

The Dutch Prosecutor brought a case against Van Anraat. The District Court of the Hague acquitted him of the charge of complicity to genocide (because his genocidal intent could not be proved), but he was convicted of complicity in war crimes and the court sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal of The Hague upheld the District Court’s acquittal on the charge of complicity to genocide and his conviction of complicity to war crimes. The Court increased Van Anraat’s sentence to 17 years’ imprisonment.

Emmanuel Rukundo was born on 1 December 1959 in Mukingi Community, Rwanda. In February 1993, Rukundo, an ordained priest, was appointed as a military chaplain for the Rwandan army, a position he maintained throughout the genocide in 1994.

On 27 February 2009, Trial Chamber II of the ICTR found him guilty of genocide, murder and extermination as crimes against humanity and sentenced him to 25 years' imprisonment. The conviction was based on the participation of the Accused in the killings of Tutsi civilians in the Gitarama prefecture. In mid-April 1994, Rukundo, with soldiers of the Rwandan army abducted and killed Madame Rudahunga and severely beat and injured her two children. He was present during the commission of this crime and the soldiers acted under his authority. In addition, between mid-April and the end of May 1994, on at least four occasions Rukundo was found to have played an integral role in the abduction and subsequent killing of Tutsi refugees from the St. Léon Minor Seminary. He was also found guilty of sexually assaulting a young Tutsi woman.

Rukundo’s stature as a well-known priest in the community and the fact that he was an educated person were considered by the Chamber as aggravating factors. He was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment.

Who can be held responsible in a Court of law for human rights violations? In this case, victims and relatives of victims of the South African apartheid regime sued several corporations for their involvement in South Africa in the period between 1948 and 1994. They were liable, the plaintiffs reasoned, because the police shot demonstrators “from cars driven by Daimler-Benz engines”, “the regime tracked the whereabouts of African individuals on IBM computers”, “the military kept its machines in working order with oil supplied by Shell”, and so forth. After the Supreme Court remitted the case, the District Court established a framework to determine when corporations can be held liable for human rights violations. Simply doing business with a state which violates the law of nations is not sufficient to establish liability, but if a corporation provides means by which human rights violations can be carried out and if the corporation knows that its action will substantially contribute the perpetrator in committing human rights violations, liability can be established. After applying this framework to several allegations made against several corporations, the Court establishes that part of these claims are plausible, thus allowing these claims to proceed.