Search results

It is well accepted in international law that Heads of State, Heads of Government and ministers of Foreign Affairs enjoy immunity from prosecution by virtue of the office that they hold. This immunity extends to acts committed in an official capacity whilst in office, after they have left office. In recent years, however, this concept of functional immunity has been challenged by allegations that former government officials have committed international crimes whilst in office. In what has been hailed as a ‘landmark’ decision, the Federal Criminal Court of Switzerland considered that the former Algerian Minister of Defence, who is charged with having committed war crimes and torture whilst in office in 1992-1993, is not entitled to immunity before the Swiss courts. In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered that it would be contrary for international law to prohibit genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity as fundamental norms but then to allow for a broad interpretation of functional immunity the result of which would be that beneficiaries of this immunity would be immune from prosecution even where they allegedly committed such crimes. 

Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui was charged with crimes against humanity (crimes committed on a widespread basis and directed against civilians) and war crimes (prohibited acts committed during war) that occurred during the attack against the Bogoro village on 24 February 2003. In particular, the Accused was suspected of killing, training and using children to support his military activities, destroying houses, and attacking the inhabitants of the Bogoro village. These crimes were allegedly committed by the accused together with Germain Katanga and other persons.

Regarding of the use of children, the Trial Chamber stated that these were often present in military groups in Ituri. However, it was not proven that the accused himself trained or involved children under the age of fifteen in war activities.

In addition, it was not proven that the accused was a commander of Lendu group in February 2003. Therefore, he was released. Nevertheless, regardless of the acquittal of the accused, the Trial Chamber emphasised that the acquittal does not mean that crimes were not committed on 24 February 2003 and that the victims did not suffer damages. 

The Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo case is the second judgment issued by the ICC, and its first acquittal.

The Supreme Court of the Netherlands affirmed the strong approach to dual attribution taken by the Court of Appeal and dismissed the appeal. It found that it is possible for both the Netherlands and the UN to have effective control over the same wrongful conduct and that attributing this conduct to the Netherlands did not in any way determine whether the UN also exercised effective control over the Dutchbat troops (pp. 22-23, para. 3.11.2).

This case is important, as it marks the first time an individual government has been held to account for the conduct of its peacekeeping troops operating under a UN mandate. Liesbeth Zegveld, the Dutch lawyer who represented the victims, stated that “a U.N. flag doesn’t give...immunity as a state or as an individual soldier.” As a result of this judgment, two Bosnian families are now expected to receive damages from the Dutch state, and other cases may follow.

T, a Rwandan national who had lived in exile in Denmark under a false name since 2001, was brought before a Danish court in 2011 for committing genocide, namely heading a death squad and participating in the slaughter of 25,000 Tutsis in a Rwandan town in 1994.

While the Rwandan authorities requested T's extradition in February 2012, the Danish Supreme Court decided on 26 April 2012 that T. could be prosecuted in Denmark for genocide. Nevertheless, on 29 June 2012 the Minister of Justice decided that T. was to be extradited to Rwanda. T. challenged this decision, but both the first instance and appeals courts dismissed his arguments.

In last instance, the Supreme Court found, referring inter alia to the Sweden v. Ahorugeze-decision on extradition in a rather similar situation, that there was no reason to not extradite T. It confirmed the earlier decisions.

On 27 January 2015, the Hague Court of Appeal convicted Omar H. for training for terrorism and making preparations to commit arson and/or an explosion. Thus, the Appeals Court agreed with the District Court of Rotterdam that Omar H. had prepared to commit arson and/or an explosion. However, it distanced itself from the District Court’s finding that Omar H. had not trained for terrorism as, according to the District Court, his actions could not be considered as “training”. On the contrary, the Hague Court of Appeal decided that training for terrorism had to be interpreted broadly. Researching how to make bombs online, and buying items to make explosive devices in light of Omar H’s interest in jihad and travel to Syria were sufficient to prove he had trained himself to commit a terrorist crime. Omar H. was sentenced in total to 18 months’ imprisonment by the Court of Appeal.