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After the takeover of Prijedor (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the attack launched against the town of Kozarac (Bosnia and Herzegovina) in 1992, the non-Serb civilians were detained in several prison facilities, where they were beaten, sexually assaulted, tortured, killed and otherwise mistreated. Duško Tadić was the President of the Local Board of the Serb Democratic Party in Kozarac (Bosnia and Herzegovina). Trial Chamber II found Duško Tadić guilty of crimes against humanity and war crimes and, in a separate sentencing judgment, sentenced him to 20 years of imprisonment. The Appeals Chamber found him guilty of additional crimes, and remitted the issue on sentencing to a Trial Chamber.

Trial Chamber IIbis considered that Tadić’s awareness of, and enthusiastic support for, the attacks on the non-Serb civilian population of Prijedor were aggravating circumstances.  Trial Chamber IIbis found that Tadić’s good behaviour in the United Nations Detention Unit and his personal circumstances were mitigating factors. 

Furthermore, Trial Chamber IIbis held that a crime against humanity is more serious than a war crime due to its widespread or systematic scale and the quantity of the crimes. 

Tadić was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment.

Tihomir Blaškić was brought before the ICTY for his role as Commander of the armed forces of the Croatian Defence Council during the events that took place in the area of Lašva Valley (Bosnia and Herzegovina) between May 1992 and January 1994. The Trial Chamber found him responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity and sentenced him to 45 years of imprisonment. 

The Appeals Chamber found numerous errors in the trial judgment. 

Firstly, it held that the mental requirement for the mode of responsibility of ordering a crime under the Statute of the Tribunal was erroneously determined. Convicting Blaškić on the basis of the same facts under two separate modes of responsibility was also found to be an error. Secondly, the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber made errors in its assessment of the contextual requirements of crimes against humanity. And thirdly, the Appeals Chamber acquitted Blaškić of several charges committed in various locations in central Bosnia since it found that the prerequisite elements of these crimes have not been fulfilled.

The Appeals Chamber concluded by reducing Blaškić' sentence to 9 years prison.

The case against Milan Babić centered around the crimes that were committed by Serb forces in the Autonomous Region of Krajina (SAO Krajina) in Croatia, later known as the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). Between August 1991 and February 1992, Serb forces attacked towns and villages in the Krajina region. After taking over control of the area, a campaign of crimes was commenced during which Croats and other non-Serbs were subjected to murder, imprisonment, deportation, forcible transfer and destruction of their homes, properties and cultural institutions. Babić held several high-level positions, such as President of the RSK. 

On 27 January 2004, Babić pleaded guilty to the crime against humanity of persecutions and, subsequently, on 28 January 2004, Trial Chamber I issued its judgment. It found that the crimes were of extreme gravity and Babić's high level political position was an aggravating factor since he made resources available and prepared the Serb population to accept the crimes of persecution. Trial Chamber I also found several mitigating factors, including Babić's guilty plea, cooperation with the Prosecution, his remorse and family situation. Babić appealed.

The Appeals Chamber rejected his grounds of appeal: the Trial Chamber had given due consideration to the facts and circumstances, including the mitigating and aggravating factors, and since it is not bound by any agreement between parties, it did not err in not following the requested sentence. The fact that one mitigating factor (the post-conflic efforts to further peace) were wrongly disregarded, did not make the overall sentence of thirteen years' imprisonment unfair

The pronouncement of this judgment constituted one of the fastest completions of a trial of this level in the history of the Tribunal. Nizeyimana, the Accused, known as the ‘Butcher of Butare’, went on trial in January 2011. In 54 trial days, the parties presented evidence from 84 witnesses. During the proceedings almost 130 decisions were issued. The judgment was rendered just over six months from the parties’ closing submissions.

The Accused is a former captain at the Butare military academy called the École des Sous-Officiers (ESO). The Prosecution charged him with genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes for violence perpetrated in Butare prefecture, and, for the most part, in Butare town for mobilising ESO soldiers and others to rape and kill Tutsis, as well as other civilians.

Nizeyimana was found guilty of genocide, extermination and murder as crimes against humanity and murder as war crime. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.

On 14 February 2005, a bomb in downtown Beirut exploded, killing 22 people, including the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafik Hariri. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon was established by the Security Council in order to prosecute persons responsible for the bombing.

In its interlocutory decision, the Appeals Chamber interpreted the STL Statute to require application of substantive Lebanese law as applied by Lebanese courts, but not before noting that binding international obligations, including customary international law, should inform any such interpretation. The Appeals Chamber held, inter alia, that not only does a customary rule exists between states to suppress terrorist act, but that terrorism is an individual international crime under customary law.

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon Appeals Chamber examined state practice and binding international covenants to assert that the crime of terrorism is “commonly accepted at the international level.” As such, the Chamber derived the key components in formulating a general definition of terrorism: (1) the perpetration of a criminal act; (2) the intent to spread fear among the population or coerce a national or international authority to take some action; (3) and the act involves a transnational element.  For the first time, a tribunal of international character has established the existence of a customary rule of international law recognizing an international crime of terrorism in times of peace.