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Agathe Habyarimana (maiden name: Agathe Kanzigas) is the widow of former Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana whose death on 6 April 1994 marked the beginning of the Rwandan genocide that was to result in the death of some 500,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus within the lapse of a few months. Agathe Habyarimana is frequently regarded as one of the powers behind Juvénal habyarimana’s Presidencey and as part of the inner circle responsible for the planification and organisation of the Rwandan genocide. On 9 April 1994, she was airlifted to France.

In July 2004, she applied for refugee status but her application was denied by the French Office of Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA). The rejection was confirmed on appeal by the Appeals Commission for Refugees in February 2007.

On appeal to the Conseil d’Etat, the highest administrative court in France, Agathe Habyarimana sought to prove that the Appeals Commission had committed an error in law and in fact when it concluded that she had participated in the planning, organising and direction of the genocide in Rwanda since 1990 and ultimately denied her request to overturn the rejection of her request for refugee status. The Conseil d’Etat rejected the appeal by a decision of 16 October 2009.

Under the authoritarian regime of Major General Barre in Somalia, the Somali Armed Forces perpetrated a number of human rights abuses against the Somali civilian population, in particular against members of the Isaaq clan.

The petitioners, all members of the Isaaq clan, allege that in the 1980s and 1990s they suffered ill-treatment at the hands of the Somali military including acts of rape, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention. They instituted a civil complaint against Mohamed Ali Samantar, the-then Minister of Defence and later Prime Minister of Somalia on the basis of the Torture Victims Protection Act.

The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that Samantar enjoys immunity from proceedings before courts of the United States by virtue of his function as a State official at the relevant time under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed this decision, arguing that the FSIA is not applicable to individuals, and even if it were, the individual in question would have to be a government official at the time of proceedings commencing against him.

By the present decision, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals: the FSIA is not applicable to individuals so Samantar does not enjoy immunity from the present proceedings by virtue of it. Consequently, proceedings against him can continue. 

Al Bihani, Yemeni citizen and Saudi Arabian national, travelled to Afghanistan in May 2001 on jihad (holy war). He became a member of the 55^th Arab Brigade and, by his own admission, acted as a cook. The Brigade carried out a number of operations in support of the Taliban against the United States and its allies in the Northern Alliance. Al Bihani was transferred to the custody of the United States Armed Forces and thereafter to Guantanamo Bay following the surrender of his unit. Alleging the illegality of his detention at Guantanamo, al Bihani petitioned the District Court for the District of Columbia for a writ of habeas corpus. His petition was denied on the grounds that he was an “enemy combatant” within the meaning of the definition of such decided by the Court in its earlier case of Boumedienne v. Bush. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia dismissed Al Bihani’s appeal.

Al Bihani appealed the decision arguing that he was entitled to a rehearing. A seven-member panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia denied the rehearing and upheld the decision that international law does not limit the President’s powers of detention and consequently al Bihani’s detention is lawful. However, all seven Circuit judges appended opinions demonstrating the importance of the question at hand and their separate reasoning.

In 2007, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a claim against Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., a subsidiary of Boeing, on behalf of five individuals from Iraq, Yemen, Ethiopia, Italy and Egypt. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been victims of the CIA’s extraordinary rendition programme – covert operations whereby individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism were secretly detained, transferred all over the world by “black flights” and taken to “black sites” or secret prisons where they were tortured for years. The role of Jeppesen – a company specialised in the aviation sector, providing navigational information, crew and fleet management solutions, and other services in the sector – in this practice was, allegedly, that the company facilitated the CIA’s black flights, inter alia,by providing airports with false flight plans to conceal all information about the aircrafts.

In first instance, after the U.S. government intervened in the case on the side of Jeppesen, the claim was dismissed immediately as the California District Court found that the state secret doctrine prevented it from reviewing the case. This judgment was partly revoked in appeal when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that defendants had not properly proven that the state secret doctrine was applicable; the case was remanded for rehearing, though. Ultimately, in its 6-5 majority decision of 8 September 2010, the full bench of the Appeals Court ruled that in the current case the state secret doctrine indeed applied, concluding that ruling in the case would be impossible due to substantial information being “privileged” or non-disclosable. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claim was dismissed.

The armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo opposed numerous tribes of different ethnicities in their struggle to gain power and territory, particularly over the Ituri provence in the north-eastern part of the DRC, an area rich in natural resources such as gold and diamonds. One such group, the Union Patriotique des Congolais, was established in 2000 and appointed as its chairman, the Accused, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. He was also the commander in chief of the armed wing of the UPC, the Front Patriotique pour la Libération du Congo. This armed group was well-known for its use of young children to participate in the hostilities, from fighting, to cooking, cleaning, spying, and being used as sexual slaves.

Trial Chamber I, in the International Criminal Court’s first verdict, convicted Thomas Lubanga of the offense of conscripting, enlisting or using children to actively participate in hostilities. In defining active participation, the Chamber adopted a broad definition so as to include children involved even indirectly, so long as their contribution placed them in real danger as a potential target. Unfortunately, the Chamber did not discuss whether sexual violence against these children also fell within the scope of the offense.