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Vinko Kondić was born on 25 September 1953 in Donje Sokolovo in the municipality of Ključ, Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the war in the former Yugoslavia, he served as a member of the Executive Committee of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) Municipal Organisation in Ključ, as Commander of the Ključ police station (SJB), as member of the Ključ Crisis Headquarters and as member of the Ključ Defence Council. The Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina claimed that Kondić participated in the crimes committed in June 1991 against Bosnian Muslims (Bosniak) and Croat civilians. In particular, he allegedly killed and transferred Bosniak and Croat men to concentration camps where they were beaten, threatened with weapons, and tortured.

Jadranko Palija, a former member of the Serbian army, was accused of having committed war crimes against civilians and crimes against humanity during the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The indictment against him accused him of participation in 19 murders and some counts of intimidation and rape committed against Bosniak and Croatian civilians. On 28 November 2007, Palija was found guilty on all charges by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and sentenced to 28 years in prison. He appealed against his conviction, but this did not help him: on 24 April 2008, the Appellate Panel of the Court ruled that the Trial Panel had been correct in both its analysis of the facts and the application of the law. Therefore, the conviction and prison sentence were both confirmed.

On 12 August 2001 the village of Ljuboten, located in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), was attacked. The police killed ethnic Albanians and set fire to homes in the village. Ljube Boškoski was the Minister of the Interior of the FYROM while Johan Tarčulovski was a police officer. For their role and participation in these events, they were brought before Trial Chamber II of the ICTY. While Trial Chamber II acquitted Boškoski of the charges, it did find Tarčulovski guilty of war crimes.

Tarčulovski presented seven grounds of appeal to the Appeals Chamber, arguing that Trial Chamber II made incorrect interpretations of the law with regard to the elements of war crimes, his individual criminal responsibility and in considering evidence.

The Prosecution appealed the acquittal of Boškoski on the ground that he should have been held responsible for his failure to punish his subordinates for committing the crimes at Ljuboten.

However, the Appeals Chamber disagreed with both the Accused and the Prosecution; Tarčulovski's sentencing was upheld, and so was Boškoski's acquital.

The case came as a result of information that Afghan terror detainees transferred by the British Armed Forces to the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) were beaten and physically mistreated. Maya Evans, a U.K. peace activist, sought to stop that practice and brought a case before the British High Court of Justice. On 25 June 2010, the Court decided that there was a chance that detainees were indeed mistreated at the NDS detention facility in Kabul. Therefore, the Court banned detainee transfers to this NDS facility. Transfers to the NDS facilities in Kandahar and Lashkar Gah remained allowed, although the Court imposed a series of ‘safeguards’ and monitoring arrangements on all future transfers of detainees.

On 15 September 2008, Trial Chamber I found Delić guilty of war crimes for his role in the events in the Livade and Kamenica Camps between July and August 1995. Delić appealed the decision but died before the Appeals Chamber could issue a judgment on his appeal. 

The Chamber was faced with two questions. First, whether the death of Delić will terminate the appeals proceedings, and second, whether this termination will render the Trial Chamber's initial judgment final. 

With regard to the first issue, the Chamber found that it only has jurisdiction when the persons before it are natural persons which implies that they are alive. This means that the death of the appellant will terminate the appeal. As concerns the second issue, now that no appeal judgment could be rendered in this trial because of the death of the appellant, the trial judgment remains in force.