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Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač, and Zoran Vuković were brought before the ICTY for their roles in the commission of crimes against the Bosnian Muslim civilians between April 1992 and February 1993. During this time, an armed conflict existed between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims, and the Bosnian Serb Army and paramilitary groups detained Bosnian Muslim women and subjected them to repeated rapes, torture and other mistreatments.

Trial Chamber II found that the acts of the Bosnian Serbs amounted to war crimes and crimes against humanity. It found the three accused responsible for these crimes.

Dragoljub Kunarac was found guilty of crimes against humanity (torture, rape, enslavement), and war crimes (torture and rape) and, subsequently, sentenced to 28 years of imprisonment.

Radomir Kovač was also found guilty of the war crimes of rape and outrages upon personal dignity, as well as the crimes against humanity of enslavement and rape. He was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment.

Zoran Vuković was found guilty of torture and rape as both war crimes and crimes against humanity. Trial Chamber II sentenced him to 12 years of imprisonment.

In the first appeals judgment from a case before the Special Panels for Serious Crimes, the Court of Appeal of East Timor was seized by Joao Fernandez, a member of the Dadurus Merah militia group, which operated in East Timor during Indonesia’s occupation of the latter. Fernandez had been convicted by the Special Panels and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment for murder after he pleaded guilty to stabbing a village chief twice in the back with his samurai sword until the chief died.

On appeal, he argued that the fact that he was acting on the orders of the militia chief and the Indonesian Armed Forces should have secured his acquittal before the Special Panels. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal finding that, on the basis of the proven facts, Fernandez did intentionally and with premeditation murder the village chief. The Indonesian Penal Code does not provide that superior orders may exclude criminal responsibility, unless those orders were given by a competent authority. Neither the militia chief nor the Indonesian Armed Forces had the legal competence to order the killing of individuals, nor was Fernandez under a legal obligation to follow those orders. The Court of Appeal also upheld his sentence. 

Maurice Papon was a civil servant in Occupied France during World War II holding the position of Secretary-General of the Gironde prefecture.

The Assize Court of Gironde – a criminal trial court hearing cases of defendants accused with the most serious crimes – convicted Papon of complicity in crimes against humanity, sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay a sum in excess of 700 000 Euros in damages to the victims admitted as civil parties to the criminal proceedings. Papon brought his case before the Conseil d’Etat­ – France’s highest administrative court – on the grounds that French law provides that, where the State is also at fault in the events that lead to the civil servant’s conviction, then the State shall pay a portion of the damages to which the civil servant was sentenced.

In the present case, the Conseil d’Etat found that a personal fault attached to Papon himself for actively assisting in the arrest, internment and eventual deportation of Jewish individuals in Gironde from 1942 until 1944 but that the French administration was also at fault, independent of Papon’s actions, by adopting measures that would facilitate the deportation. Consequently, the Conseil d’Etat ordered the State to pay half of the damages.

Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni citizen, was Osama bin Laden’s driver. Captured in Afghanistan in 2001 by members of the United States Armed Forces, he was transferred to the United States detention centre at Guantanamo Bay in 2002. By an order of the President of the United States, Hamdan was designated to stand trial before a United States Military Commission for charges of conspiracy to commit multiple offenses, including attacking civilians and civilian objects, murder by an unprivileged belligerent, destruction of property by an unprivileged belligerent and terrorism. Hamdan’s counsel applied for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the military commissions were unlawful and trial before them would violate Hamdan’s rights of access to a court.

The District Court for the District of Columbia in a decision of 8 November 2004 found that Hamdan could not be tried by the military commission until such time as a competent tribunal has determined whether he is entitled to prisoner of war status. Only in the event that the outcome of such a determination is negative may Hamdan be tried by military commission, provided that the military commission amends its rules which currently preclude the presence of the accused at certain hearings of his own trial. Without such amendments, trial by military commission would be unlawful. The decision is the first in a line of case law before the United States courts and military commissions in the case of Hamdan. 

On 28 April 2005, Trial Chamber III of the ICTR sentenced Mikaeli Muhimana to imprisonment for the remainder of his life. The Trial Chamber found Muhimana, a former conseiller of Gishyita Sector in Kibuye prefecture, guilty on three counts: genocide, rape as a crime against humanity and murder as a crime against humanity.

The Chamber found Muhimana guilty of murdering several Tutsi civilians, including a pregnant woman whom he had disembowelled in order to see what the foetus looked like. The Chamber found that Muhimana’s active participation in the decapitation of Assiel Kabanda, and the subsequent public display of his severed head also constituted an aggravating factor. The Accused was found criminally liable for committing and abetting rapes as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the Tutsi civilian population. He had personally raped several Tutsi women in his home and at other locations. He also raped a girl whom he believed to be Tutsi, and apologized to her when he later found out that she was, in fact, Hutu.