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The accused, Dutch businessman Guus Kouwenhoven, was suspected of involvement in smuggling arms to Liberia (through his Liberian-based timber factories) during the Second Liberian Civil War - in violation of UN arms trade bans - and accomodating/complicity in the numerous war crimes that were committed with these weapons. He was taken into custody by the Dutch police in 2005, and put on trial.

Although the Court of First Instance found him guilty of arms smuggling (but quashed the war crimes charges), the Court of Appeal later found that he could not be convicted for any of the charges due to lack of evidence. The prosecution appealed and ultimately the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal had erred by not properly motivating its decision not to allow an examining judge to assess whether two anonymous witnesses - who were allegedly very close to Kouwenhoven and Charles Taylor, and therefore key to the prosecution's case - should be admitted as protected witnesses, could be provided a protected witness-status so as to testify in the case. The appeals judgment was declared null and void and the case was referred to another Court of Appeals.

The case is currently still before the Court of Appeal: due to the case being assessed anew on all facts and evidence, an enormous amount of requests relating to the admission of (new) evidence has been filed.

In 2007, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a claim against Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., a subsidiary of Boeing, on behalf of five individuals from Iraq, Yemen, Ethiopia, Italy and Egypt. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been victims of the CIA’s extraordinary rendition programme – covert operations whereby individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism were secretly detained, transferred all over the world by “black flights” and taken to “black sites” or secret prisons where they were tortured for years. The role of Jeppesen – a company specialised in the aviation sector, providing navigational information, crew and fleet management solutions, and other services in the sector – in this practice was, allegedly, that the company facilitated the CIA’s black flights, inter alia,by providing airports with false flight plans to conceal all information about the aircrafts.

In first instance, after the U.S. government intervened in the case on the side of Jeppesen, the claim was dismissed immediately as the California District Court found that the state secret doctrine prevented it from reviewing the case. This judgment was partly revoked in appeal when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that defendants had not properly proven that the state secret doctrine was applicable; the case was remanded for rehearing, though. Ultimately, in its 6-5 majority decision of 8 September 2010, the full bench of the Appeals Court ruled that in the current case the state secret doctrine indeed applied, concluding that ruling in the case would be impossible due to substantial information being “privileged” or non-disclosable. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claim was dismissed.

Several villagers from Aceh, Indonesia, filed a civil suit against oil and gas company Exxon Mobil. They argued that the company carried responsibility for human rights violations committed by Indonesian security forces by hiring these forces and because Exxon Mobil knew or should have known that human rights violations were being committed.

In an appeal against two previous rulings in this case, plaintiffs held that they should be allowed to sue Exxon for violations of the law of nations and for violations of state law. The question whether they were allowed to sue for violations of the law of nations hinged primarily on whether corporations can be sued for these violations and whether it is possible to sue for aiding-and-abetting international crimes. These questions were for the most part answered in the affirmative. The question whether they were allowed to sue for violations of state law hinged primarily on the question whether non-resident aliens could even bring a case before the Court. The Court stated that there was no absolute bar for non-residents aliens to sue and that this question had to be answered case-by-case. The Court of Appeals referred the case back to the District Court for further assessment.      

After the civil war in Papua New Guinea, which led to Bougainville obtaining a more autonomous position, several inhabitants of that island sued the mining company Rio Tinto, basically for its role in the war and the process leading up to it. The plaintiffs claimed that Rio Tinto’s mining activities had harmed their health and the environment, and that they had helped the Papua New Guinea government in, among other things, setting up a blockade with disastrous results for the population. In this instance, the District Court had to rule whether referring the plaintiffs back to the Papua New Guinean legal system should be considered. The District Court held that this would be inappropriate with regard to the plaintiffs’ claims of war crimes, crimes against humanity and racial discrimination, as these claims are of ‘universal concern’.

With the case back at the Court of Appeals, the question to be determined was the scope of the jurisdiction of the ATCA with regard to genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity arising from a blockade and racial discrimination. The Court held that genocide and war crimes fall within the scope of the ATCA. These norms, according to the Court, are specific, universal and obligatory accepted and extend to corporations. However, the crimes against humanity arising from a blockade and the racial discrimination claims are not and, therefore, the case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings on the claims of genocide and war crimes.