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Hutchins III: United States of America v. Lawrence G. Hutchins III

Published Opinion of the Court, 22 Apr 2010, Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, Washington D.C., United States

Lawrence G. Hutchins III was a U.S. Marine Sergeant and a squad leader of a unit conducting counterinsurgency operations. Together with seven other U.S. Marines, they were accused of having killed Iraqi war veteran Hashim Ibrahim Awad on 26 April 2006.

The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction due to lack of a fair trial when one of Hutchins’ primary attorneys departed shortly before the court-martial began. Hutchins was once more freed on appeal on 26 June 2013 when the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces threw out the convictions entered against him, after he has served half of his 11-year sentence. On 28 January 2014 the commanding general of the U.S. Marine Corps moved for third retrial “due to the seriousness of the charges and the amount of evidence that had been compiled through investigations.”


Mutua et al. v. UK: Ndiki Mutua, Paulo Nzili, Wambugu Wa Nyingi, Jane Muthoni Mara and Susan Ngondi v. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Approved Judgment, 21 Jul 2011, The High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Great Britain (UK)

The claimants in this case claimed that they were victims of severe atrocities at the hands of the colonial government during the struggle for independence in Kenya. They argued that the British government carried responsibility for this, while the British government argued that they could not be held responsible for atrocities which, if proven, were committed by the Colonial government in the 1950s. Therefore, the British government requested the Court to dismiss the case before it would come to a trial. The Court refused to do this, stating that evidence existed of torture in pre-independence Kenya and of some UK involvement. This evidence, the Court reasoned (without establishing the liability of the British government), should be assessed in Court. 


Case of Ahorugeze v. Sweden

Judgment, 27 Oct 2011, European Court of Human Rights, France

Sylvère Ahorugeze was a Rwandan national and former director of the Rwandan Civil Aviation Authority and Kigali international airport. An international arrest warrant was issued against him on the basis of his alleged participation in the crime of genocide (intentional destruction of a national, racial, ethnical or religious group or part of it) and crimes against humanity (crimes committed on large scale including but not limited to murder, rape, torture) committed in Rwanda in 1994. On 16 July 2008, Ahorugeze was arrested in Sweden and on 7 July 2009, the Swedish government decided that he could be extradited to Rwanda. 

Subsequently, Ahorugeze filed an application at the ECtHR.  He claimed that his health was poor, and that his Hutu ethnic background, the prison conditions in Rwanda, and a lack of impartiality and independence of the judiciary were factors that should prevent his extradition to Rwanda. The Court dismissed his case and held that there were no reasons to believe that Ahorugeze would be subjected to inhumane or unfair treatment in Rwanda and that he would not receive a fair trial.


Prosecutor v. Mohammed G.

Judgment, 29 Aug 2016, District Court of Rotterdam, The Netherlands

On 9 October 2015 the Dutch citizen Mohammed G. was arrested because the Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service AIVD believed he was about to travel to Syria or Iraq. This was not the first time the defendant was arrested; in an earlier judgment Mohammed G. was ordered to spend a year in a psychiatric hospital because he suffered from hallucinations that ordered him to join the jihadi armed struggle in Syria or Iraq.

In the current case, the Court held that the defendant was well aware of the things he would participate in if he were to travel to Syria or Iraq. For example, the defendant was recorded saying ‘I want to fight, I want to kill, I want to be’. The Court therefore ruled that the defendant was guilty of seeking to obtain for himself or for others the opportunity, means or information for the commission of arson and/or causing explosions and/or murder and/or manslaughter. According to the Court, the participation in the jihadi armed struggle can be qualified as those crimes. The defendant committed the crimes with terrorist intent.

A psychological report of the defendant was drawn up, which concluded that the defendant’s intelligence bordered on him being mentally handicapped. The Court concurred with these findings and concluded that the defendant was in a state of partially diminished responsibility. The Court therefore sentenced the defendant to three years imprisonment and a hospital order (TBS), to reduce the risk of recidivism.


Krofan & Andea: Krofan and Andea v. Public Prosecutor

Judgment, 5 Oct 1966, Federal Court of Singapore, Singapore

In May 1961, Malaya proposed the formation of the Federation of Malaya by amalgamating Malaya, Singapore and the British colonies in Borneo (Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei). Whilst Indonesia did not initially oppose the Federation, it did following the outbreak in 1962 of revolt in Brunei by a radical Muslim movement. From 1962 until 1966, a state of armed conflict existed between Indonesia and the Federation of Malaysia (of which Singapore was part since its merger in September 1963), otherwise known as the Indonesia-Malaysian Confrontation.

It was in the context of this armed conflict that on 14 April 1965, Stanislaus Krofan and Andres Andea set foot on Singapore/Malay soil carrying explosives with the intention of setting them off. Upon apprehension, they claimed that they were members of the Indonesian Armed Forces and had been ordered by their superiors to set off the explosives in Singapore. They were convicted by the High Court in Singapore for unlawful possession of explosives in a security area.

On appeal, the Federal Court of Singapore was asked to determine the applicability of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to Singapore at the time of the offence and determine whether Krofan and Andea were entitled to protections as prisoners of war under the Convention. By its judgment of 5 October 1966, the Court assumed that the 1949 Geneva Conventions were applicable and concluded that the appellants were not entitled to protection as prisoners of war. Although members of the Indonesian Armed Forces, they had been caught in civilian clothing acting as saboteurs. 


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