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The claimants in this case claimed that they were victims of severe atrocities at the hands of the colonial government during the struggle for independence in Kenya. They argued that the British government carried responsibility for this, while the British government argued that they could not be held responsible for atrocities which, if proven, were committed by the Colonial government in the 1950s. Therefore, the British government requested the Court to dismiss the case before it would come to a trial. The Court refused to do this, stating that evidence existed of torture in pre-independence Kenya and of some UK involvement. This evidence, the Court reasoned (without establishing the liability of the British government), should be assessed in Court. 

Sylvère Ahorugeze was a Rwandan national and former director of the Rwandan Civil Aviation Authority and Kigali international airport. An international arrest warrant was issued against him on the basis of his alleged participation in the crime of genocide (intentional destruction of a national, racial, ethnical or religious group or part of it) and crimes against humanity (crimes committed on large scale including but not limited to murder, rape, torture) committed in Rwanda in 1994. On 16 July 2008, Ahorugeze was arrested in Sweden and on 7 July 2009, the Swedish government decided that he could be extradited to Rwanda. 

Subsequently, Ahorugeze filed an application at the ECtHR.  He claimed that his health was poor, and that his Hutu ethnic background, the prison conditions in Rwanda, and a lack of impartiality and independence of the judiciary were factors that should prevent his extradition to Rwanda. The Court dismissed his case and held that there were no reasons to believe that Ahorugeze would be subjected to inhumane or unfair treatment in Rwanda and that he would not receive a fair trial.

On 9 October 2015 the Dutch citizen Mohammed G. was arrested because the Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service AIVD believed he was about to travel to Syria or Iraq. This was not the first time the defendant was arrested; in an earlier judgment Mohammed G. was ordered to spend a year in a psychiatric hospital because he suffered from hallucinations that ordered him to join the jihadi armed struggle in Syria or Iraq.

In the current case, the Court held that the defendant was well aware of the things he would participate in if he were to travel to Syria or Iraq. For example, the defendant was recorded saying ‘I want to fight, I want to kill, I want to be’. The Court therefore ruled that the defendant was guilty of seeking to obtain for himself or for others the opportunity, means or information for the commission of arson and/or causing explosions and/or murder and/or manslaughter. According to the Court, the participation in the jihadi armed struggle can be qualified as those crimes. The defendant committed the crimes with terrorist intent.

A psychological report of the defendant was drawn up, which concluded that the defendant’s intelligence bordered on him being mentally handicapped. The Court concurred with these findings and concluded that the defendant was in a state of partially diminished responsibility. The Court therefore sentenced the defendant to three years imprisonment and a hospital order (TBS), to reduce the risk of recidivism.

In May 1961, Malaya proposed the formation of the Federation of Malaya by amalgamating Malaya, Singapore and the British colonies in Borneo (Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei). Whilst Indonesia did not initially oppose the Federation, it did following the outbreak in 1962 of revolt in Brunei by a radical Muslim movement. From 1962 until 1966, a state of armed conflict existed between Indonesia and the Federation of Malaysia (of which Singapore was part since its merger in September 1963), otherwise known as the Indonesia-Malaysian Confrontation.

It was in the context of this armed conflict that on 14 April 1965, Stanislaus Krofan and Andres Andea set foot on Singapore/Malay soil carrying explosives with the intention of setting them off. Upon apprehension, they claimed that they were members of the Indonesian Armed Forces and had been ordered by their superiors to set off the explosives in Singapore. They were convicted by the High Court in Singapore for unlawful possession of explosives in a security area.

On appeal, the Federal Court of Singapore was asked to determine the applicability of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to Singapore at the time of the offence and determine whether Krofan and Andea were entitled to protections as prisoners of war under the Convention. By its judgment of 5 October 1966, the Court assumed that the 1949 Geneva Conventions were applicable and concluded that the appellants were not entitled to protection as prisoners of war. Although members of the Indonesian Armed Forces, they had been caught in civilian clothing acting as saboteurs. 

During the fighting between Indonesia and Malaysia, twelve Malaysian Chinese members of the Indonesian Air Force who were heavily armed, infiltrated into Malaysia (ten by parachute and two by boat). They were arrested, convicted pursuant to Malaysian law and sentenced to death. The Federal Court of Malaysia held that two members were protected pursuant to international law, in particular the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1949. On appeal, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decided that they were not protected under the 1949 Geneva Convention because they were nationals of Malaysia (the state that detained them). Therefore, they could be prosecuted under national law for offences against that law.