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The principle of non-refoulement prohibits deportation of a person if there is a significant risk of that person being subjected to torture in the country of arrival. The principle has been repeatedly in the spotlights since 2001, as states came under increasing obligation to deny safe havens to terrorists. However, as this case proves, the principle was an issue even before September 11, 2001.

After the Federal Court rejected Manickavasagam Suresh’s complaint against the decision to deport him, the Court of Appeal reassessed this rejection. It concluded that while torture is prohibited in all cases, there can be circumstances in which a person is removed to a country where he/she is at risk of being subjected to torture. On several places, the Court reiterated that a Minister sometimes has to subordinate the interests of one person to societal interests like national security. In this case, Suresh support of the Tamil Tigers justified the Minister’s appraisal. Such a decision increases public confidence in an adequate application of immigration law, according to the Court. Suresh’s appeal was rejected. 

In this landmark case, fourteen Guantanamo detainees petitioned for habeas corpus, requesting judicial review of their indefinite detention without charges. 

Revisiting the holding in Johnson v. Eisentrager (1950), the Supreme Court decided 6-3 that US courts have jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in the course of armed conflict and subsequently detained outside the sovereign territory of the United States at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. Rasul was found to differ from Eisentrager in the “plenary and exclusive jurisdiction” held by the US over Guantanamo; the Court ruled that US courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges from Guantanamo detainees under the terms of the general federal habeas statute.

Vladimir Kovačević was a Commander of the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA)  during the Croatian War of Independence (1991-1995). On 6 December 1991, Kovačević allegedly ordered his troops to bombard the city of Dubrovnik. As a result, two people were killed, three others were seriously wounded, six buildings were destroyed, and 46 buildings were substantially damaged.

In February 2001, Kovačević was officially charged with violation of the laws of war (attack against civilians and civilian objects). Even though Kovačević was initially to be tried at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), he was declared mentally sick and not fit to stand trial.

In November 2006, the ICTY referred the case to the authorities of the Republic of Serbia.

On 26 July 2007, the Serbian Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor issued an indictment against Kovačević, charging him with war crimes against civilians.

The Afghani Habibullah Jalalzoy applied for political asylum in the Netherlands in 1996, but this was refused due to suspicion of his involvement in torture and war crimes during the war in Afghanistan in the 1980’s. However, Jalalzoy stayed in the Netherlands, and after investigations he was arrested in 2004. The Hague District Court convicted him for war crimes and torture committed by him as member of the military intelligence agency KhaD-e-Nezami (KhAD). He was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision. Consequently, Jalalzoy appealed at the Supreme Court, arguing that both the District Court and Court of Appeal had erred in law on several points. The Supreme Court disagreed, and held that Dutch courts had jurisdiction over the crime, that prosecution was admissible, that the crimes were not time-barred (as Dutch law excludes war crimes from becoming so), and that the convictions had been in conformity with the law. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

Who can be held responsible in a Court of law for human rights violations? In this case, victims and relatives of victims of the South African apartheid regime sued several corporations for their involvement in South Africa in the period between 1948 and 1994. They were liable, the plaintiffs reasoned, because the police shot demonstrators “from cars driven by Daimler-Benz engines”, “the regime tracked the whereabouts of African individuals on IBM computers”, “the military kept its machines in working order with oil supplied by Shell”, and so forth. After the Supreme Court remitted the case, the District Court established a framework to determine when corporations can be held liable for human rights violations. Simply doing business with a state which violates the law of nations is not sufficient to establish liability, but if a corporation provides means by which human rights violations can be carried out and if the corporation knows that its action will substantially contribute the perpetrator in committing human rights violations, liability can be established. After applying this framework to several allegations made against several corporations, the Court establishes that part of these claims are plausible, thus allowing these claims to proceed.