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It is well accepted in international law that Heads of State, Heads of Government and ministers of Foreign Affairs enjoy immunity from prosecution by virtue of the office that they hold. This immunity extends to acts committed in an official capacity whilst in office, after they have left office. In recent years, however, this concept of functional immunity has been challenged by allegations that former government officials have committed international crimes whilst in office. In what has been hailed as a ‘landmark’ decision, the Federal Criminal Court of Switzerland considered that the former Algerian Minister of Defence, who is charged with having committed war crimes and torture whilst in office in 1992-1993, is not entitled to immunity before the Swiss courts. In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered that it would be contrary for international law to prohibit genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity as fundamental norms but then to allow for a broad interpretation of functional immunity the result of which would be that beneficiaries of this immunity would be immune from prosecution even where they allegedly committed such crimes. 

In 1994, an armed conflict between the Rwandese government forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Front and the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsis claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of citizens in Rwanda and the elimination of approximately 75% of the Tutsi population.

Joseph Mpambara was a member of the interahamwe militia who fled Rwanda for Kenya and finally the Netherlands after 1994. He is charged with having murder, rape, kidnapping, hostage taking and torture against several Tutsi individuals including young children who were hacked with machetes after being forced out of an ambulance with their mother. Since the Accused is a non-Dutch national and the crimes with which he is charged did not occur on Dutch territory and did not implicate Dutch nationals in any way, the question of jurisdiction arose.

In the present decision, the Court of Appeal of The Hague confirmed the decision of the District Court of The Hague that the Dutch courts have no jurisdiction over the crime of genocide allegedly commited by the Accused. This does not, however, bar prosecution of the Accused for war crimes and torture. 

Emmanuel Rukundo was born on 1 December 1959 in Mukingi Community, Rwanda. In February 1993, Rukundo, an ordained priest, was appointed as a military chaplain for the Rwandan army, a position he maintained throughout the genocide in 1994.

On 27 February 2009, Trial Chamber II of the ICTR found him guilty of genocide, murder and extermination as crimes against humanity and sentenced him to 25 years' imprisonment. The conviction was based on the participation of the Accused in the killings of Tutsi civilians in the Gitarama prefecture. In mid-April 1994, Rukundo, with soldiers of the Rwandan army abducted and killed Madame Rudahunga and severely beat and injured her two children. He was present during the commission of this crime and the soldiers acted under his authority. In addition, between mid-April and the end of May 1994, on at least four occasions Rukundo was found to have played an integral role in the abduction and subsequent killing of Tutsi refugees from the St. Léon Minor Seminary. He was also found guilty of sexually assaulting a young Tutsi woman.

Rukundo’s stature as a well-known priest in the community and the fact that he was an educated person were considered by the Chamber as aggravating factors. He was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment.

Ahmad al-Y. was accused of two crimes: the war crime of outrage upon personal dignity and participation in a terrorist organisation. The court finds that the accused fought in Syria alongside the terrorist organisation Ahrar al-Sham and he is therefore convicted of participation in a terrorist organisation.

Unlike the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeal does not find the suspect guilty of the war crime of outrage upon personal dignity. The videos show the accused spitting towards the deceased person and putting his foot near a body, while he was celebrating a victory over soldiers of the Syrian Government. Although the actions of him and his fellow fighters are disrespectful and distasteful, the court finds that this conduct does not meet the threshold necessary for this crime. The conduct is not degrading or humiliating enough. The victims are not severely suffering and are not displayed as a trophy.

The accused is sentenced to five years and four months of imprisonment, which is lower than usual, since the case took unreasonably long.

A Rwandan national who had lived in exile in Denmark under a false name was brought before a Danish court for committing genocide, namely heading a death squad and participating in the slaughter of 25,000 Tutsis in a Rwandan town in 1994.

The Danish Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the 1955 Genocide Act permitted Danish courts to prosecute persons accused of genocide, even where the genocide was not committed in Denmark and the Accused was not a Danish national. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of two lower courts and found that the charge of genocide in Rwanda by a Rwandan national could be raised before Danish courts indeed. The wording of the 1955 Genocide Act made genocide a criminal offense in Denmark, even if it was committed outside Denmark; moreover, Danish law did not require the accused to be a Danish national. It suffices that genocide is a crime both under Danish and Rwandan law: therefore, T. could be prosecuted before a Danish court