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On 14 August 1985, 60 women, children and elderly men were killed in the highlands village of Accomarca in Peru’s southern Andean region of Ayacucho. This massacre is known as the Accomarca Massacre.

The plaintiffs brought a complaint against Telmo Ricardo Hurtado Hurtado (Second Lieutenant (Subteniente) in the Peruvian Army) who was responsible for the command of the soldiers that committed the killings. The plaintiffs sought justice on behalf of all the members of the Asociación de Familiares Afectados por la Violencia Política del Distrito de Accomarca (Association of Relatives of the Victims of Political Violence in Accomarca) who lost relatives in the massacre. Hurtado was found guilty for the crimes committed in connection with the Accomarca Massacre.

On 4 March 2008, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida ordered Hurtado to pay $37 million in damages to the plaintiffs.

What happened after a makeshift bomb ended the life of a US Navy Marines Corporal near the village of Haditha on 19 November 2005? After increasing media attention, the US army launched an investigation and charged eight marines, as raids against the population of Haditha allegedly resulted in the death of 24 civilians. Proceedings were initiated against Jeffrey Chessani, a commander who had not been present during the explosion and its aftermath, but had allegedly failed to adequately report and investigate the incident.

However, by the time the Navy-Marine Corps Court Trial Judiciary rendered a judgment, the legal question did not revolve around Chessani’s role during the incidents, but around the question whether there was an appearance of unacceptable influence on the case by Colonel Ewers, an important figure in military legal circles. The NMCTJ ruled that the US government had failed in refuting the appearance of “unlawful command influence”. According to the NMCTJ, the presence of someone with Ewers’ reputation, who had strong views regarding Chessani’s guilt, could have influenced the prosecutor and legal advisers. Therefore, charges against him were dismissed.

During the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, Zrinko Pinčić was a member of the Croat Defense Council (HVO). Between November 1992 and March 1993, he came to a house in the village of Donje Selo, Konjic Municipality, were Serb civilians were detained. During this time, Pinčić repeatedly took one woman from the room where other civilians were detained, and forced her to sexual intercourse, holding his rifle by the bed and threatening her that he would bring another 15 soldiers to rape her and other detainees, if she refused him.

The Court found Zrinko Pinčić guilty of the criminal offence of War Crimes against Civilians and sentenced him to 9 years imprisonment. The Court first determined that the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina was applicable to the case, and not the Criminal Code of Yugoslavia (SFRY) that was in place at the time. Next, the Court determined that Pinčić had committed a war crime against a civilian. This was the case, as the criminal acts of Pinčić were committed in violation of international law as the victim was a civilian and was raped; they were committed in time of armed conflict; the act was connected with the armed conflict as Pinčić was a soldier and lastly because Pinčić committed the offence with premeditated intent and wanted to commit it. In determining the sentence, the Court primarily considered the gravity of the criminal offence and the degree of his criminal liability. The Court considered as extenuating circumstances that Pinčić is father of two children, his fair conduct before the Court, his old age and the fact that he was an 80 per cent disabled veteran.

This case revolved around three individuals who were working in prison camps during the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia in 1992: Željko Mejakić, Chief of Security of Omarska Camp; Momčilo Gruban, leader of one of three guard shifts at Omarska camp;Dušan Fuštar, leader of one of three guard shifts in Keraterm camp; and Duško Kneževic, who held no official position at any of the camps, but who regularly entered the camps at will, assumedly in search of information about the person who had killed his brother during the war. All four men were initially indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia for charges of crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, torture and other inhumane acts. However, in 2006, they were transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina to be tried there.

After the case was separated into two, Fuštar, in his own case, entered into a plea agreement with the prosecution and received a nine year sentence. The other three were still tried together. The Trial Panel found them guilty and sentenced Mejakić to 21 years’ imprisonment, Kneževic to 31 years and Gruban to eleven years. They appealed against their conviction; the Appellate Panel partly granted their appeal, but mostly for insignificant parts, leading to Mejakić’s and Kneževic’s conviction and sentence to be upheld. With regard to Gruban, however, the Appellate Panel found that the first instance verdict did not properly take into consideration the mitigating factors – namely, that Gruban had in several instances helped detained people in order to at least alleviate their suffering – and reduced his sentence to seven years.

Who can be held responsible in a Court of law for human rights violations? In this case, victims and relatives of victims of the South African apartheid regime sued several corporations for their involvement in South Africa in the period between 1948 and 1994. They were liable, the plaintiffs reasoned, because the police shot demonstrators “from cars driven by Daimler-Benz engines”, “the regime tracked the whereabouts of African individuals on IBM computers”, “the military kept its machines in working order with oil supplied by Shell”, and so forth. After the Supreme Court remitted the case, the District Court established a framework to determine when corporations can be held liable for human rights violations. Simply doing business with a state which violates the law of nations is not sufficient to establish liability, but if a corporation provides means by which human rights violations can be carried out and if the corporation knows that its action will substantially contribute the perpetrator in committing human rights violations, liability can be established. After applying this framework to several allegations made against several corporations, the Court establishes that part of these claims are plausible, thus allowing these claims to proceed.