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Who can be held responsible in a Court of law for human rights violations? In this case, victims and relatives of victims of the South African apartheid regime sued several corporations for their involvement in South Africa in the period between 1948 and 1994. They were liable, the plaintiffs reasoned, because the police shot demonstrators “from cars driven by Daimler-Benz engines”, “the regime tracked the whereabouts of African individuals on IBM computers”, “the military kept its machines in working order with oil supplied by Shell”, and so forth. The main legal issue to be solved by the District Court was whether it had jurisdiction over this case under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which allows non-Americans to sue in federal Court for a violation of a small group of international norms. The District Court ruled that this case did not fall within the scope of the ATCA for several reasons. They could not be qualified as state agents carrying out illegal state actions, business activities in South Africa during the apartheid era could not be defined as a breach of the ‘law of nations’ under the ATCA and neither could aiding and abetting to an international norm violation. 

Who can be held responsible in a Court of law for human rights violations? In this case, victims and relatives of victims of the South African apartheid regime sued several corporations for their involvement in South Africa in the period between 1948 and 1994. They were liable, the plaintiffs reasoned, because the police shot demonstrators “from cars driven by Daimler-Benz engines”, “the regime tracked the whereabouts of African individuals on IBM computers”, “the military kept its machines in working order with oil supplied by Shell”, and so forth. Whereas the District Court in first instance had granted the corporations’ motion to dismiss the case, the Court of Appeals ruled that the case could proceed. The District Court had ruled that aiding and abetting violations of customary international law could not provide a basis for jurisdiction. The majority of the panel disagreed, though for different reasons: one judge relied on international law to substantiate this, another solely relied on national law. A third judge dissented, arguing that this case should not be allowed to proceed, among other things because of fierce opposition from both South Africa and the US.

Who can be held responsible in a Court of law for human rights violations? In this case, victims and relatives of victims of the South African apartheid regime sued several corporations for their involvement in South Africa in the period between 1948 and 1994. They were liable, the plaintiffs reasoned, because the police shot demonstrators “from cars driven by Daimler-Benz engines”, “the regime tracked the whereabouts of African individuals on IBM computers”, “the military kept its machines in working order with oil supplied by Shell”, and so forth. After the Supreme Court remitted the case, the District Court established a framework to determine when corporations can be held liable for human rights violations. Simply doing business with a state which violates the law of nations is not sufficient to establish liability, but if a corporation provides means by which human rights violations can be carried out and if the corporation knows that its action will substantially contribute the perpetrator in committing human rights violations, liability can be established. After applying this framework to several allegations made against several corporations, the Court establishes that part of these claims are plausible, thus allowing these claims to proceed. 

The Bemba case represents a significant milestone in international law, particularly concerning the doctrine of command responsibility. Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba, a former Vice-President of the Democratic Republic of Congo, was charged with two counts of crimes against humanity (murder and rape) and three counts of war crimes (murder, rape, and pillaging). These charges were linked to the actions of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), a militia group under his command, in the Central African Republic (CAR) between 2002 and 2003. 

Mr. Bemba's trial was groundbreaking in several aspects. It was one of the first major ICC trials focusing on sexual violence as an international crime, setting a precedent for how such crimes are prosecuted globally. The prosecution argued that Mr. Bemba had effective command and control over the MLC troops and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or repress the commission of these crimes, nor did he submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. 

The defense contended that Mr. Bemba had limited means to control his forces once they were deployed in CAR and that he was not directly responsible for the atrocities committed. They argued for his inability to exercise control over the troops due to communication challenges and logistical constraints. 

The judgment and the legal reasoning behind it delved into the nuances of command responsibility, assessing the extent of a military leader's liability for the actions of their subordinates. The trial also addressed complex issues of jurisdiction, admissibility, and the participation of victims in the proceedings, making it a landmark international criminal law case. 

This case was closely watched by international legal experts and human rights advocates, as it had significant implications for how commanders at all levels are held accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The verdict was seen as a test of the ICC's ability to bring high-ranking officials to justice and a statement on the international community's commitment to addressing grave human rights violations. 

On 1 September 2016, Sydneysider Hamdi Alqudsi was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 6 years, for his involvement in assisting seven fighters to travel to the conflict in Syria. Mr. Alqudsi was convicted by a jury on 12 July 2016 after attempting to argue that he was trying to save lives in Syria. Ultimately, it was found through intercepted communications that he was well aware of what the fighters he helped get to Syria and the Islamic State were doing there. Moreover, Judge Adamson acknowledged that he had been a key player in the movement of fighters from Australia to Syria as he linked those who wanted to travel with another fighter who was already there and had joined a jihadi group.