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Momčilo Krajišnik was found guilty by Trial Chamber I on multiple counts of crimes against humanity for his role in the 1991-1992 events in municipalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He appealed the decision, representing himself. The Appeals Chamber appointed a counsel as amicus curiae (friend of the Court) to assist his case through the filing of an additional appeal in order to represent Krajišnik's interests.

The Appeals Chamber held that Trial Chamber I made errors with respect to the expansion of the crimes forming part of the joint criminal enterprise of the perpetrators and the manner in which Krajišnik could be held liable for them. Therefore, it acquitted Krajišnik of murder, extermination and persecution as crimes against humanity.

The Appeals Chamber rejected the arguments of the Prosecution, in which the latter argued that the sentence was not properly determined by Trial Chamber I, and should be raised to life imprisonment.

In light of the acquittals on several counts, the Appeals Chamber reduced Krajišnik's sentence from 27 years to 20 years of imprisonment.

Can a state be held legally responsible for not taking a strong stance against human rights violations committed by another state? In this case, a Palestinian human rights organization requested a UK court to give its legal opinion  about UK foreign policy, in relation to Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip during the Winter of 2008/2009 (‘Operation Cast Lead’ or the ‘Gaza War’). The court most important statement was that it did not consider itself authorized to rule on foreign policy. According to the court, foreign policy is made by the government’s executive branch and it should remain within that exclusive domain.

Tharcisse Renzaho, a former Rwandan Armed Forces Colonel, had been charged by the Prosecutor of the ICTR with genocide, or, in the alternative, complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity (murder and rape) and war crimes (murder and rape) for his role in the Rwandan genocide.

The Trial Chamber found the Accused guilty of genocide, murder and rape as crimes against humanity and murder and rape as war crimes. Specifically, the Chamber concluded that Renzaho had supported the killings of Tutsis at roadblocks, which were set up following his directives. It also found that he had ordered the distribution of weapons, and that were later used to kill Tutsis. In addition, the Accused had supervised a selection process at a refugee site called CELA, where about 40 Tutsis were abducted and killed. The Chamber further held that Renzaho had participated in an attack at the Sainte Famille church, where more than 100 Tutsis had been killed. He had also encouraged the sexual abuse of women and was found criminally liable for the rape that followed.

For his role in these events, the Chamber sentenced him to life imprisonment.

Adnan Farhan Abdul Latif, a Yemeni national, was arrested in Pakistan together with other Yemeni citizens as part of a dragnet seizure of Yemeni nationals in 2001 and 2002. They were transferred to the United States Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay (Cuba) in January 2002. In 2004, the Petitioners filed for writs of habeas corpus (a legal action requiring a court to determine the legality of the detention of an arrested person).

On 21 July 2010, the US District Court for Columbia granted the petition and ordered the release of Latif for lack of evidence. According to Judge Henry Kennedy, the US the government failed to meet the evidence standard to prove that Latif was part of a terrorist organisation, concluding that his continued detention was unlawful. The US Government appealed the decision.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision of 21 July 2010. The Court of Appeals considered that the intelligence report, which stood as central evidence against Latif, was entitled to a presumption of regularity and the inconsistencies of the Report are likely the result of imperfect translations. The Court of Appeal also found inconsistencies in Latif’s account of the events. Based on these findings, the Court of Appeals reversed the granted habeas corpus petition.

In this case, the plaintiff held that building a bridge to Hindmarsh in South Australia would impede on the culture and way-of-life of the Ngarrindjeri in such a dramatic way that it would lead to the destruction of this group. However, at that point, genocide was not a crime under Australian national law. The plaintiff therefore invoked legislation from the UK, arguing that application of this legislation was possible because of the fact that the UK preceded the current Commonwealth of Australia in governing the Australian continent and its adjacent islands. The judge did not accept this argument and reiterated that even when international law prohibits genocide, someone can only be found guilty of genocide if national legislation explicitly prohibits genocide. The claim was denied. Sumner was unsuccessful in appealing to this judgment. The full chamber of South Australia’s Supreme Court reiterated that the interlocutory appeal to prevent the start of constructing the bridge should be denied, as there was no serious case to be tried. It did so, most importantly, because the ‘underpinning’ of the case, the allegation that building the bridge was in essence a genocidal act, was not substantiated with referral to domestic law.