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Adnan Farhan Abdul Latif, a Yemeni national, was arrested in Pakistan together with other Yemeni citizens as part of a dragnet seizure of Yemeni nationals in 2001 and 2002. They were transferred to the United States Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay (Cuba) in January 2002. In 2004, the Petitioners filed for writs of habeas corpus (a legal action requiring a court to determine the legality of the detention of an arrested person).

On 21 July 2010, the US District Court for Columbia granted the petition and ordered the release of Latif for lack of evidence. According to Judge Henry Kennedy, the US the government failed to meet the evidence standard to prove that Latif was part of a terrorist organisation, concluding that his continued detention was unlawful. The US Government appealed the decision.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision of 21 July 2010. The Court of Appeals considered that the intelligence report, which stood as central evidence against Latif, was entitled to a presumption of regularity and the inconsistencies of the Report are likely the result of imperfect translations. The Court of Appeal also found inconsistencies in Latif’s account of the events. Based on these findings, the Court of Appeals reversed the granted habeas corpus petition.

In this case, the plaintiff held that building a bridge to Hindmarsh in South Australia would impede on the culture and way-of-life of the Ngarrindjeri in such a dramatic way that it would lead to the destruction of this group. However, at that point, genocide was not a crime under Australian national law. The plaintiff therefore invoked legislation from the UK, arguing that application of this legislation was possible because of the fact that the UK preceded the current Commonwealth of Australia in governing the Australian continent and its adjacent islands. The judge did not accept this argument and reiterated that even when international law prohibits genocide, someone can only be found guilty of genocide if national legislation explicitly prohibits genocide. The claim was denied. Sumner was unsuccessful in appealing to this judgment. The full chamber of South Australia’s Supreme Court reiterated that the interlocutory appeal to prevent the start of constructing the bridge should be denied, as there was no serious case to be tried. It did so, most importantly, because the ‘underpinning’ of the case, the allegation that building the bridge was in essence a genocidal act, was not substantiated with referral to domestic law.

Following the decision of the Indonesian government taken in early 1999 to offer East Timor the opportunity to vote for independence or for autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia, violence erupted in East Timor. The defendants in this case took part in a widespread or systematic attack directed against civilians that were in favour of an independent East Timor. One of the accused, Herman Sedyono, was the Bupati (District Administrator) of the Covalima District, one of the 13 districts in East Timor. As such, he was bearing the primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the region. Most of the other accused were Commander or just member of the Indonesian security authorities (TNI) or the Indonesian police force (POLRI), which were both promoting autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia.

In 1999, the Mahidi and the Laksaur pro-Indonesian militia groups, with the help of the TNI and POLRI, and with support from the Covalima District administration, repeatedly committed attacks against the Covalima population (mainly against those that were in favour of independence). The attacks involved crimes such as unlawful arrests, destruction of property, detention, and murder. The 16 accused were charged with encouraging, assisting and failing to stop, arrest or prosecute the perpetrators of the crimes.

Members of the Herero (the Hereros), an African tribe from Namibia, brought a claim against German company Deutsche Afrika-Linien GmbH & Co. The Hereros claimed that this company used slave labor and ran its own concentration camp during Germany’s occupation of South Africa in the late 19th- and early 20th- century. The Hereros sued the German company for damages suffered during the occupation.

The case was dismissed by the District Court because the Hereros failed to state a claim in their complaint. On 10 April 2007, the dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

On 14 February 2005, a bomb in downtown Beirut exploded, killing 22 people, including the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafik Hariri. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon was established by the Security Council in order to prosecute persons responsible for the bombing.

In its interlocutory decision, the Appeals Chamber interpreted the STL Statute to require application of substantive Lebanese law as applied by Lebanese courts, but not before noting that binding international obligations, including customary international law, should inform any such interpretation. The Appeals Chamber held, inter alia, that not only does a customary rule exists between states to suppress terrorist act, but that terrorism is an individual international crime under customary law.

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon Appeals Chamber examined state practice and binding international covenants to assert that the crime of terrorism is “commonly accepted at the international level.” As such, the Chamber derived the key components in formulating a general definition of terrorism: (1) the perpetration of a criminal act; (2) the intent to spread fear among the population or coerce a national or international authority to take some action; (3) and the act involves a transnational element.  For the first time, a tribunal of international character has established the existence of a customary rule of international law recognizing an international crime of terrorism in times of peace.