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Klaus Barbie was a member of the German SS and later the head of the Gestapo in Lyon, Occupied France in 1942. He was wanted by the French authorities for charges of crimes against humanity committed during World War II, during which time he earned the nickname the ‘Butcher of Lyon’ in recognition of his notorious interrogation style.

After the war, he was recruited by the Army Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States, which later helped him emigrate to Bolivia. When the French authorities became aware of his residence in Bolivia, an arrest warrant was issued. Bolivia expelled Barbie and, as he was disembarking a plane in French Guyana, he was picked up by French authorities and detained.

The present decision was his final appeal challenging the proceedings against him on the grounds that the statute of limitations for his alleged crimes had expired and that the French law of 1964 which held that there are no statutes of limitations for crimes against humanity was contrary to the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law. The Supreme Court of France (Criminal Law Chamber) rejected the appeal. It held that it was a general principle of civilised nations that crimes against humanity were not subject to statutes of limitation, meaning that an individual suspected of having committed them could be prosecuted irrespective of how long ago the alleged crimes occurred. 

Klaus Barbie was a member of the German SS and later the head of the Gestapo in Lyon, Occupied France in 1942. He was wanted by the French authorities for charges of crimes against humanity committed during World War II, during which time he earned the nickname the ‘Butcher of Lyon’ in recognition of his notorious interrogation style.

After the war, he was recruited by the Army Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States, which later helped him emigrate to Bolivia. When the French authorities became aware of his residence in Bolivia, an arrest warrant was issued. Bolivia expelled Barbie and, as he was disembarking a plane in French Guyana, he was picked up by French authorities and detained. A crucial question in his case has been the qualification of the crimes with which he is charged: crimes against humanity are not subject to a statute of limitations and may therefore be prosecuted irrespective of how long ago they were committed. By contrast, war crimes are subject to the French statute of limitations of 10 years. The present decision was an appeal by a widow, a victim of Barbie’s who had lost her husband and her son during the war, against a decision of a lower court which held that her application to become a civil party was inadmissible as the she was a victim of war crimes and not crimes against humanity, and thus the 10 year statute of limitations had expired. The Supreme Court of France overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal of Lyon, finding that a crime can simultaneously be qualified as a crime against humanity and a war crime.

Klaus Barbie was a member of the German SS and later the head of the Gestapo in Lyon, Occupied France in 1942. He was wanted by the French authorities for charges of crimes against humanity committed during World War II, during which time he earned the nickname the ‘Butcher of Lyon’ in recognition of his notorious interrogation style.

After the war, he was recruited by the Army Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States, which later helped him emigrate to Bolivia. When the French authorities became aware of his residence in Bolivia, an arrest warrant was issued. Bolivia expelled Barbie and, as he was disembarking a plane in French Guyana, he was picked up by French authorities and detained.

After a series of decisions regarding challenges to the jurisdiction of the French courts, Barbie was convicted for multiple counts of crimes against humanity by the Cour d’assises of Rhone and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1987. The present decision was his final appeal; it was rejected in its entirety by the Supreme Court of France. Barbie died in prison in 1991 at the age of 77. 

Eight inhabitants of the Northern Territory (Australia) who had been taken from their families between 1925 and 1944 under the Aboriginals Ordinance of 1918 (which allowed the forced removal of children of mixed Aboriginal descent), and a mother, Rose Napangardi McClary, whose child had been taken from her under the same law, sought a declaration that the Ordinance was unconstitutional. They instituted legal proceedings in 1995. In July 1997, the High Court rejected all their arguments and held that the Ordinance was not unconstitutional.

After the referendum on the independence of East Timor from Indonesia, violence erupted between pro-independence and pro-integration groups. On September 6, 1999 the Ave Maria church in Suai, in the Kovalima regency, in which civilians were taking refuge, was attacked by pro-integration militias Laksaur and Mahidi. The militias entered the church with homemade firearms and sharp weapons, killing 27 people.

At the time of the attack on the church in Suai, Herman Sedyono, an Indonesian Army Officer, was the regent or Chief of Kovalima regency and as such the head of government and the head of the regional authorities.

Before the attack a meeting took place at the official residence of Herman Sedyono. Herman Sedyono and the four other accused, Lilik Kushardianto,  Ahmad Syamsuddin, Sugito (Indonesian military officials) and Gatot Subyakto (a police officer) were all present at the incident at the Suai Church.

The Court found that grave human rights violations, in the form of murder as a crime against humanity, had taken place at the Suai Church. The crimes against humanity were committed by militia groups Laksaur and Mahidi. The Court found insufficient proof that the accused were responsible for the attacks on the basis of command responsibility. With regard to Herman Sedyono and Gatot Subyakto, the Court found that they were not military commanders or persons that effectively act as military commanders, as Sedyono was in function of head of the government and Subyakto was a police officer. The Court concluded that there was no organisational relation between the militias and the accused and that the accused had no effective control over the militias, so that the accused could not be held responsible for their actions.