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Five men, allegedly members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, a rebel group in Sri Lanka), were brought before the District Court of the Hague (the Netherlands) on charges of, among others, extortion, money laundering, and raising funds for a terrorist organization. The European Union (EU) placed the LTTE on a list of terrorist organizations in 2006. The present judgment was handed down against one of the suspects, identified only as Selliaha, who acted as the LTTE’s overseas bookkeeper.

The five men, including Selliaha, allegedly extorted millions of Euros through blackmails and threats in order to fund the LTTE in Sri Lanka.

The District Court found Selliaha guilty of invlovement with a criminal organization, but not of supporting terrorism. Furthermore, the District Court considered that the conflict in Sri Lanka amounts to a non-international armed conflict, but dismissed a large number of charges on the basis that the Netherlands was not party to the conflict. Moreover, the District Court ruled that the EU’s classification of the LTTE as a banned organization, made the fundraising operations unlawful in the Netherlands.

The District Court acquitted Selliaha of extortion but convicted him of threatening prospective donators. Selliaha was sentenced to 6 years of imprisonment, the longest sentence of the five accused.

We often associate genocide with the act of killing members of a specific group, of which there have been many devastating examples throughout history. However, according to the Genocide Convention, other acts can also be regarded as genocide, if they are committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, specific groups. In this case, the plaintiff held that building a bridge to Hindmarsh in South Australia would impede on the culture and way-of-life of the Ngarrindjeri in such a dramatic way that it would lead to the destruction of this group. However, at that point, genocide was not a crime under Australian national law. The plaintiff therefore invoked legislation from the UK, arguing that application of this legislation was possible because of the fact that the UK preceded the current Commonwealth of Australia in governing the Australian continent and its adjacent islands. The judge did not accept this argument and reiterated that even when international law prohibits genocide, someone can only be found guilty of genocide if national legislation explicitly prohibits genocide. The claim was denied.

In 2002, with the adoption of the International Criminal Court Act 2002, genocide became a crime under Australian law.

In this case, the plaintiff held that building a bridge to Hindmarsh in South Australia would impede on the culture and way-of-life of the Ngarrindjeri in such a dramatic way that it would lead to the destruction of this group. However, at that point, genocide was not a crime under Australian national law. The plaintiff therefore invoked legislation from the UK, arguing that application of this legislation was possible because of the fact that the UK preceded the current Commonwealth of Australia in governing the Australian continent and its adjacent islands. The judge did not accept this argument and reiterated that even when international law prohibits genocide, someone can only be found guilty of genocide if national legislation explicitly prohibits genocide. The claim was denied. Sumner was unsuccessful in appealing to this judgment. The full chamber of South Australia’s Supreme Court reiterated that the interlocutory appeal to prevent the start of constructing the bridge should be denied, as there was no serious case to be tried. It did so, most importantly, because the ‘underpinning’ of the case, the allegation that building the bridge was in essence a genocidal act, was not substantiated with referral to domestic law.

We often associate genocide with the act of killing members of a specific group, of which there have been many devastating examples throughout history. However, according to the Genocide Convention, other acts can also be regarded as genocide, if they are committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, specific groups. In this case, the plaintiff had already sought (and failed to find) two interlocutory injunctions to prevent a bridge from being built to Hindmarsh in South Australia. It was held that this construction would impede on the culture and way-of-life of the Ngarrindjeri in such a dramatic way that it would lead to the destruction of this group. The judge did not agree that the construction would amount to genocide and reiterated earlier judgments that genocide was not a criminal act under Australian law. Treaties are not a direct source of law in Australia, and neither is customary international law.

In 2002, with the International Criminal Court Act 2002, genocide became a crime under Australian law.

The applicants were relatives of six Iraqi nationals who were killed by the British forces in Iraq in 2003. The applicants brought a claim against the Secretary of State because he refused to investigate the deaths and to provide redress to them as relatives of the deceased Iraqi’s. Their claim was dismissed on 13 June 2007 by the House of Lords. In dismissing the case, the House of Lords held that the crimes were committed outside the UK’s territory, and therefore, the Court did not have power to adjudicate (jurisdiction).