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Dual Australian-Serbian citizen “Captain Dragan” (Dragan Vasiljkovic, known in Australia as Daniel Snedden) was the first Australian citizen to be extradited from Australia. Croatia alleges that Snedden committed war crimes against prisoners of war and civilians in 1991 and 1993 whilst in command of Serbian paramilitary troops. 

In this case, the Court held that there was no reviewable error in the Minister’s determination under Section 22 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) that Snedden should be extradited. While the determination process had taken a considerable time, delay did not lead to the expiration of the Minister’s power, nor had procedural unfairness been demonstrated.

The Court also held that because the Minister was not bound to consider Article 129 of the Third Geneva Convention in making his determination, any errors in the interpretation of that Article would not vitiate the decision. The Court did not rule on the correctness of the interpretation.

This case highlights the desirability of domestic legislation implementing international agreements in jurisdictions such as Australia where international agreements entered into by the country are not automatically binding in the domestic legal system.

In 2003, bulldozers manufactured by the American company Caterpillar were used by the Israeli IDF to destroy several houses on the Gaza Strip, killing several Palestinians and an American peace activist in the process. The relatives of the victims and those who lost their homes filed a suit against Caterpillar, arguing that by providing the Israeli military with bulldozers, they were liable for, among other things, war crimes and extrajudicial killing.

The District Court dismissed the claim, most importantly because it considered that selling products to a foreign government does not make the seller liable for subsequent human rights violations. Also, the Court stated that it could not prohibit Caterpillar to sell bulldozers to Israel, as this would infringe upon the government’s executive branch’s exclusive right to decide on trade restraints regarding Israel.   

After the civil war in Papua New Guinea, which led to Bougainville obtaining a more autonomous position, several inhabitants of that island sued the mining company Rio Tinto, basically for its role in the war and the process leading up to it. The plaintiffs claimed that Rio Tinto’s mining activities had harmed their health and the environment, and that they had helped the Papua New Guinea government in, among other things, setting up a blockade with disastrous results for the population.

In this instance, the District Court had to rule whether referring the plaintiffs back to the Papua New Guinean legal system should be considered. The District Court held that this would be inappropriate with regard to the plaintiffs’ claims of war crimes, crimes against humanity and racial discrimination, as these claims are of ‘universal concern’. However, regarding other claims (of environmental harm, of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment and of consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights) the Court held that it could be assessed whether the plaintiffs should first exhaust legal remedies in Papua New Guinea. Therefore, it gave the plaintiffs one month to decide whether they wished to pursue these claims.  

The accused, Dutch businessman Guus Kouwenhoven, was suspected of involvement in smuggling arms to Liberia (through his Liberian-based timber factories) during the Second Liberian Civil War - in violation of UN arms trade bans - and accomodating/complicity in the numerous war crimes that were committed with these weapons. He was taken into custody by the Dutch police in 2005, and put on trial.

Although the Court of First Instance found him guilty of arms smuggling (but quashed the war crimes charges), the Court of Appeal later found that he could not be convicted for any of the charges due to lack of evidence. The prosecution appealed and ultimately the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal had erred by not properly motivating its decision not to allow an examining judge to assess whether two anonymous witnesses - who were allegedly very close to Kouwenhoven and Charles Taylor, and therefore key to the prosecution's case - should be admitted as protected witnesses, could be provided a protected witness-status so as to testify in the case. The appeals judgment was declared null and void and the case was referred to another Court of Appeals.

The case is currently still before the Court of Appeal: due to the case being assessed anew on all facts and evidence, an enormous amount of requests relating to the admission of (new) evidence has been filed.