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R. v. Hersi

Sentencing of accused for participating in terrorist group and counselling another person to participate in terrorist group, 24 Jul 2014, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Canada, Canada

Mr. Hersi was a naturalized Canadian citizen from Somalia living in Toronto. A drycleaner found a USB in Hersi’s security guard uniform containing suspicious documents, such as instructions on how to make explosives as well as various Islamic religious writings. The drycleaner notified the police, and the police investigated Mr. Hersi further using an undercover officer. During these meetings with the undercover officer, Mr. Hersi explained his well-developed plan to join the terrorist organisation Al-Shabaab and suggested that the UC also join.

The Court found Mr. Hersi guilty of (1) attempting to participate in the activities of Al-Shabaab and (2) counselling an undercover officer to participate in Al-Shabaab. The Court then sentenced Mr. Hersi to 10 years in prison, the maximum of 5 years for each of his offenses. Additionally, the Court held that Mr. Hersi be required to serve at least one-half his sentence, as opposed to the typical requirement of one-third of a sentence, before he could be released on parole, given the gravity of the offence and the unlikelihood of Hersi’s rehabilitation.


Public Committee v. Government of Israel

Judgment, 13 Dec 2006, Supreme Court of Israel, Israel

In 2002, two human rights organisations filed a petition against Israel’s policy to eliminate alleged terrorists by targeted killings. Four years later, the Supreme Court provided a judgment. It acknowledged that Israel is engaged in an armed conflict with terrorist organisations and that therefore, the laws of war should apply. Terrorists, the Court reasoned, are neither combatants nor civilians in the legal sense. The Supreme Court therefore qualified the alleged terrorists as ‘non-legal combatants’. This does not mean, however, that killing these non-legal combatants is always legal. Nor is this always illegal. The Court establishes a framework with four conditions which have to be applied on a case-to-case basis to determine the (il)legality of a targeted killing. The Court reasoned that a targeted killing is only legal if the decision to kill is 1) based on reliable evidence, 2) if there are no other choices to alleviate the danger to Israel’s national security, 3) if the attack is followed by a thorough investigation and 4) if harm to innocent bystanders is limited to the absolute minimum.


Nkunda: Général James Kabarebe v. Laurent Mihigo Nkunda

Arrêt, 26 Mar 2010, Supreme Court (Kigali), Rwanda


M. v. al-Tikriti: M. v. Barzan al-Tikriti

Décision, 22 Dec 2003, Federal Department of Defence, Switzerland


Arar v. Ashcroft: Maher Arar v. John Ashcroft et al.

Appeal from a Judgment of the United States District Court, 2 Nov 2009, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States

In one of the first suits filed before the US courts challenging the US practice of 'extraordinary rendition', Syrian-born Canadian national Maher Arar lodged a complaint in January 2004 arguing that his civil rights had been violated. In 2002, Arar was detained by immigration officials at a New York airport while travelling home to Canada from Tunisia. Following a period of solitary confinement, Arar was deported to Syria where he was allegedly tortured before making false admissions of terrorist activity.

On 16 February 2006, the US District Court dismissed Arar’s claims, finding that national security and foreign policy considerations prevented the Court from holding US officials liable, even if the ‘extraordinary rendition’ violated international treaty obligations or customary law. 

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. It held that adjudicating Arar’s claims would interfere with national security and foreign policy. In his partial dissent, Judge Sack found that this provides federal officials with licence to “violate constitutional rights with virtual impunity”. The Court of Appeals also found that as a foreign national, Arar had no constitutional due process rights.

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, this time sitting en banc (before all judges of the court), dismissed Arar’s claims for damages on the grounds that it rests upon the Congress to decide on whether such a civil remedy can be made possible and it is not the duty of the judges to decide on whether compensation could be sought.


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