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During the 1990s, several complaints of unlawful physical interrogation methods by the General Security Service reached the Israeli Supreme Court. In 1999, it assessed the essential question posed in most of these complaints: was the GSS even allowed to conduct interrogations and if so, did their interrogation methods fall within the scope of torture as prohibited by Israeli and international law. The Court answered the first question in the affirmative and deduced from a general provision in Israeli law the GSS’ authority to interrogate. However, the Court also stated that the GSS was not authorised to use most of the interrogation methods presented to the Court. These included long sleep deprivation, shaking suspects, covering suspects’ heads, and having them crouch on their toes for five minutes intervals. The GSS had argued that the ‘necessity’ defense provided sufficient authorisation to use these interrogations, as information obtained from interrogation might prevent terrorist attacks. The Court did not agree, stating that while the necessity defense might be used by an individual investigator during criminal proceedings, it cannot provide authorisation prior to using the prohibited interrogation methods.    

At the beginning of 2007, there were allegations that Afghan prisoners who were captured by Canadian forces and transferred to Afghan custody, were tortured.

On 21 February 2007, Amnesty International Canada and the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA) filed a lawsuit against the Canadian Minister of National Defence, the Chief of the Defence Staff for the Canadian forces and the Attorney General of Canada in order to halt the transfer of Afghan prisoners. Plaintiffs specifically asked for a review of the Canadian prisoner transfer policy, and, in addition, claimed that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms should provide protection to the Afghan prisoners.

The case was dismissed. In March 2008, a federal judge stated that the Afghan prisoners have rights under both the Afghan Constitution and international law, but that they did not have rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal in December 2008.

A Canadian human rights organization filed a complaint against a Canadian mining company which operated in the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC), on behalf of several Congolese victims (and relatives of victims) of violence committed by the army of the DRC in October 2004. Allegedly, Anvil Mining Ltd. provided the army with, for example, jeeps and cars to reach Kilwa, were the human rights violations were committed.

Anvil protested against the complaint filed, arguing that the Court in Québec did not have jurisdiction. The Superior Court disagreed and stated that Anvil’s activities in Québec and the mining activities in the DRC were sufficiently linked for the Court to have jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court stated that it did not consider courts in either the DRC or Australia, were the main office was located, more suitable to deal with this case. The Court of Appeal overturned this judgment, stating that the Quebec office of Anvil primarily focussed on investors and stakeholders. Therefore, the link with events in the DRC could not be established. Furthermore, it held that the complaint could also be heard in another country, most specifically Australia. Therefore, the Court found that authorities in Quebec did not have jurisdiction. 

A Canadian human rights organization filed a complaint against a Canadian mining company which operated in the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC). It does so on behalf of several Congolese victims (and relatives of victims) of violence committed by the army of the DRC in October 2004. Allegedly, Anvil Mining Ltd. provided the army with, for example, jeeps and cars to reach the town of Kilwa, were the human rights violations were committed.

Anvil protested against the complaint filed, arguing that the Court in Québec did not have jurisdiction. The Court disagreed and stated that Anvil’s activities in Québec and the mining activities in the DRC were sufficiently linked for the Court to have jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court stated that it did not consider courts in either the DRC or Australia, were the main office was located, more suitable to deal with this case.

Hungary joined the Axis powers during World War II, effectively bringing the Hungarian police and the Gendarmerie, a paramilitary police unit, under the control and direction of the German SS. Imre Finta, originally a Hungarian national, was an officer and later a captain in the Hungarian Gendarmerie. In 1944, he was dispatched to Szeged to implement the Baky Order, a decree introduced by the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior calling for the isolation, exporpriation, ghettoization, concentration, entrainment and eventual deportation of all Hungarian Jews. In connection with this order, Finta was allegedly responsible for the detention of 8 617 Hungarian Jews in brickyard, forcibly stripping them of their valuables and deporting them to concentration camps under appalling conditions.

Under new Canadian war crimes legislation, Finta (a Canadian national and resident since 1956) was brought before the Toronto court to stand trial for eight counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. He was acquitted by a jury and this decision was upheld by a majority of the Court of Appeal of Ontario. The present decision was rendered by the Supreme Court of Canada and constituted the final appeal in the case against Finta. By a narrow margin of 4:3, the appeal was dismissed, as Finta did not possess the necessary mens rea for war crimes and crimes against humanity and the Baky Order, on which he relied, did not appear as manifestly unlawful at the time of its enactment.