Ana Chavez, Cecilia Santos, Jose Calderon, Erlinda Franco and Daniel Alvarado v. Nicolas Carranza

Court	United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, United States
Case number	06-6234
Decision title	Opinion
Decision date	17 March 2009
Parties	Ana Chavez Cecilia Santos Jose Calderon Erlinda Franco Daniel Alvarado Nicolas Carranza
Categories	Crimes against humanity, Torture
Keywords	Torture; command responsibility; crimes against humanity; equitable tolling doctrine
Links	Opinion

Summary

Colonel Nicholas Carranza served nearly thirty years as an officer in the armed forces of El Salvador. Later, he was El Salvador’s Vice-Minister of Defence and Public Security from October 1979 until January 1981. In this period, the Salvadoran Security Forces carried out systematic repression and human rights abuses against opponents of the military dictatorship that ruled the country at the time.

On 10 December 2003, the Center for Justice and Accountability and the Tennessee law firm of Bass, Berry & Sims filed a complaint against Carranza on behalf of five plaintiffs.

On 18 November 2005, a jury found Carranza guilty for the abduction, torture, insult, imprisonment and killing of the plaintiffs. He was ordered to pay $6 million in damages.

On 19 March 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the jury’s verdict.

Procedural history

On 10 December 2003, a complaint was filed jointly by the Center for Justice and Accountability and the Tennessee law firm of Bass, Berry & Sims. The complaint was filed against Colonel Nicholas Carranza under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) and the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA). The complaint charged Carranza with liability for torture, extrajudicial killing, and crimes against humanity under the established doctrine of command responsibility.

On 20 January 2004, Carranza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and argued that plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations, that plaintiffs failed to exhaust available remedies in El Salvador, and that certain of their claims were barred because they were U.S. citizens.

The plaintiffs’ complaint was amended in February 2004 in order to add the claims of Daniel Alvarado.

On 8 April 2004, the plaintiffs filed a memo in opposition to defendant’s renewed motion to dismiss, which he issued after plaintiffs had amended their complaint.

On 18 November 2005, a jury at the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee held Carranza liable for crimes against humanity, torture and extrajudicial killing. Carranza was ordered to pay a total of $6 million in damages, comprised of both compensatory and punitive damages. It was the first time in history that a U.S. jury in a contested case found a commander liable for crimes against humanity.

Carranza appealed the jury verdict according to which he was liable and ordered to pay damages to the plaintiffs. He argued that the District Court abused its discretion, first, by holding that extraordinary circumstances justified equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, second, by not granting comity to the Salvadoran Amnesty Law, and, third, by making various evidentiary rulings. Carranza also argued that the Court erred in its instruction to the jury on the law of command responsibility, more specifically, that the jury should have been instructed on the issue of proximate cause.

Related developments

On 28 May 2009, Carranza filed a petition for writ of certiorari (Part 1,Part 2, Part 3) with the U.S. Supreme Court. His petition was denied.

Legally relevant facts

From the 1930s to the mid-1980s, El Salvador was ruled by a military dictatorship. By the 1970s, opposition to the military’s dominance grew increasingly. In response, militant organisations, such as the Salvadoran Security Forces, carried out systematic repression and human rights abuses against political dissenters. Civil unrest in the country resulted in a war that lasted from 1981 to 1992.

On 1 January 1992, the government of El Salvador and the Salvadoran guerrilla forces signed a Peace Accord sponsored by the United Nations. In March 1993, the Salvadoran legislature adopted an amnesty law precluding criminal or civil liability for political or common crimes committed prior to 1 January 1992.

Carranza served as a Vice-Minister of Defence of El Salvador from 1979 until 1981, a period during which security forces under Carranza's control carried out numerous human rights violations against the civilian population.

Carranza gained U.S. citizenship in 1991.

Core legal questions

Did the District Court abuse its discretion by holding that extraordinary circumstances justified equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, by not granting comity to the Salvadoran Amnesty Law, and by making certain evidentiary rulings?
Did the District Court err in its instruction to the jury on the law of command responsibility?

Specific legal rules and provisions

Title 28 U.S. Code, Chapter 85, Section 1350

Court's holding and analysis

Under the first ground of appeal, Carranza claimed abuse of discretion by the District Court in its finding that extraordinary circumstances existed that justified the equitable tolling of the ten-year statute of limitations. In this regard, the Court stressed that the ‘ten-year limitations period applicable to claims under the TVPA likewise applies to claims made under the ATS’ (p. 4). However, the Court decided that the extraordinary circumstances that existed, namely plaintiffs’ fear of reprisals from the regime against themselves or their family members, justified the application of the equitable tolling doctrine, which allows for a delay or suspension of the running time set forth in a statute of limitations (pp. 6-7). Accordingly, the Court dismissed this ground of appeal reasoning that even though the plaintiffs were not aware that they have an actionable claim under U.S. law, they did not have the safety to bring a case in El Salvador (p. 8).

With regard to the second ground of appeal, the Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to apply the Salvadoran Amnesty Law because it did not have extraterritorial application. Therefore, contrary to the claim that Carranza is entitled to amnesty pursuant to the Salvadoran Amnesty Law, the Court found that he was a ‘citizen and resident of the United States and is therefore subject to civil liability for his violations of the ATS and TVPA’ (pp. 9-10).

With respect to the appeal against the instructions given by the District Court to the jury on the law of command responsibility, the Court stated that the law of command responsibility did ‘not require proof that a commander’s behaviour proximately caused the victim’s injuries’. As a result, the claim that the jury should have been instructed on the issue of proximate cause, was dismissed (p. 16).

Therefore, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the jury’s verdict, according to which Carranza was liable for crimes against humanity, torture and extrajudicial killing.