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John Doe et al. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation et al.

Court United States District Court for the District of Columbia, United States
Case number 07-1022 (RCL)
Decision title Memorandum Opinion
Decision date 30 September 2009
Parties
  • John Doe VIII, and others
  • Exxon Mobil Corporation, and others
Categories Human rights violations
Keywords arbitrary arrest and detention, assault, battery, conversion, corporate liability, false imprisonment, kidnapping, negligence per se, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, wrongful death
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Summary

Several villagers from Aceh, Indonesia, filed a civil suit against oil and gas company Exxon Mobil. They argued that the company carried responsibility for human rights violations committed by Indonesian security forces by hiring these forces and because Exxon Mobil knew or should have known that human rights violations were being committed.

In this phase of the proceedings, the defendants requested the Court to dismiss the case, most importantly because they argued that the plaintiffs, being non-residents, could not sue in a US Court. The Court agreed with the defendants, stating that no exception should be made in this case to the general rule that non-residents cannot sue in a US court.    

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Procedural history

In 2001 eleven villagers from Aceh filed a civil suit against Exxon Mobil. The plaintiffs held that the company carried responsibility for human rights violations committed by Indonesian security forces. They argued that these forces were hired by Exxon Mobil and that the company knew or should have known that they were committing human rights violations. Plaintiffs invoked the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which allows aliens to bring a suit for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States, the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which allows for the filing of a suit regarding torture, and state tort law. The District Court on 14 October 2005 only allowed the state tort law claims to proceed. Plaintiffs amended their complaint, after which defendants filed a motion to dismiss. This motion was almost entirely dismissed on 2 March 2006 and the Court of Appeals on 12 January 2007 dismissed the appeal against this dismissal. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case on 16 June 2008. On 27 August 2008, the District Court rejected a motion to render a summary judgment with regard to Exxon Mobil Corporation and EMOI, Exxon’s Indonesian subsidiary. 

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Related developments

This dismissal was reversed by the Court of Appeals on 8 July 2011. Currently, the case is pending at the Court of Appeals in Washington D.C., where the case is assessed in light of the repercussions of the Supreme Court ruling in Kiobel v. Shell of 17 April 2013.

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Legally relevant facts

In 1975 a conflict flared up between Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, which tried to achieve independence for Aceh. One of the movements’ objections against the Indonesian government was the fact that  the government concluded agreements with American oil and gas companies to exploit Aceh’s natural resources. The plaintiffs allege that during this conflict, Exxon Mobil hired a unit of the Indonesian national army to protect its pipelines. Allegedly, these troops committed human rights violations and the plaintiffs allege that Exxon Mobil carries responsibility for this. According to the plaintiffs, Exxon Mobil “conditioned payment on providing security, made decisions about where to build bases, hired mercenaries to train the security troops, and provided logistical support”.

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Core legal questions

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss some or all of the plaintiffs’ claims under eight separate theories: (1) Lack of standing for alien plaintiffs; (2) various prudential bars to jurisdiction (act of state, comity, political question and foreign affairs preemption doctrines); (3) failure to join an indispensable party; (4) statute of limitations; (5) lack of diversity jurisdiction; (6) lack of personal jurisdiction over EMOI; (7) choice of law; and (8) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  

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Specific legal rules and provisions

  • Article III of the United States Constitution.

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Court's holding and analysis

The Court found that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue as nonresident aliens and therefore only addressed the first ground of dismissal.

It first outlined the components of standing, which are outlined in Article III of the US Constitution and in the unwritten prudential limitations (pp. 3-4). Though not exhaustively defined, these limitations have been elaborated on in case law.  In Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld and Johnson v. Eisentrager, the District Court formulated “the general rule that non-resident aliens have no standing to sue in United States courts” (p. 4). Exceptions to this general rule have been formulated, but the Court held that the plaintiffs had not invoked any of these exceptions and had merely disputed the existence of the general rule that non-residents have no standing. This argument is considered without merit by the Court and it did not see a reason to find that plaintiffs have standing in this unique factual context (p. 6). Therefore, the defendants motion to dismiss was granted.     

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Further analysis

See the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre's Case profile: ExxonMobil lawsuit (re Aceh).

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Instruments cited

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Related cases

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Additional materials

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