Gaspard Kanyarukiga v. The Prosecutor

Court	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Appeals Chamber), Tanzania
Case number	ICTR-02-78-A
Decision title	Judgement
Decision date	8 May 2012
Parties	Gaspard Kanyarukiga The Prosecutor
Categories	Crimes against humanity, Genocide
Keywords	crimes against humanity, extermination, genocide
Links	Judgement

Summary

Gaspard Kanyarukiga is a Rwandan national. At the time of the genocide in April 1994, he was a businessman who owned a pharmacy in the Nyange Trading Centre, in Kivumu commune. Trial Chamber II of the Tribunal found him guilty of participating in planning the destruction of the Nyange church on 16 April 1994, which resulted in the killing of approximately 2,000 Tutsi civilians. He was convicted under Article 6(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal for planning genocide and extermination as crime against humanity. He received a sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment.

Kanyarukiga submitted 72 grounds of appeal and the Prosecution submitted 2 grounds of appeal against the Trial Chamber’s judgment. The Appeals Chamber dismissed all the grounds of appeal, upheld his convictions for planning genocide and exterminations as a crime against humanity and affirmed the original sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment imposed on him.

Procedural history

Trial Chamber II found that Gaspard Kanyarukiga participated in planning the destruction of the Nyange church on 16 April 1994, which led to the killing of approximately 2,000 Tutsi civilians. The Chamber convicted Kanyarukiga pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute for planning genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity. He was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment (see here for the indictment).

Kanyarukiga submitted 72 grounds of appeal challenging his convictions and sentence. He requested the Appeals Chamber to set aside his convictions and acquit him on all counts or order a new trial. Alternatively, he requested a substantial reduction of the sentence imposed by Trial Chamber II.

The Prosecution responded that the Appeals Chamber should dismiss Kanyarukiga’s Appeal in its entirety and presented two grounds of Appeal.

The Appeals Chamber heard oral submissions regarding these Appeals on 14 December 2011.

Legally relevant facts

The Accused submitted that the Trial Chamber violated his right to a fair trial because it denied a stay of proceedings, failed to adjourn the proceedings on various occasions, imposed arbitrary time-limits on Defence cross-examination and failed to rule timely on the admissibility of Prosecution evidence (para. 13).

The Accused contended that errors had been made in the indictment (paras. 56-57) and with relation to the alibi evidence (paras. 89-91). He also challenged numerous aspects of the Trial Chamber’s assessment of evidence of the events at the Nyange parish (para. 172).

Under grounds 59 and 60, Kanyarukiga argued that the Trial Chamber erred in law by failing to rule on whether he was an authority, linked to the Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le développement (MRND) or otherwise. He maintained that if the Trial Chamber implicitly accepted that he was an authority or was linked to the MRND, it erred in fact (para. 256). The Accused further submitted that the Trial Chamber erred in law by disregarding his lack of motive to commit the crimes for which he was convicted (para. 260).

In its Appeal the Prosecution contended that the Chamber had erred when considering the Accused's liability for joint criminal enterprise (para. 265).

Both the Accused and the Prosecution appealed the sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber (para. 270).

Core legal questions

Whether the Trial Chamber had violated the Accused’s right to a fair trial.
Whether the Trial Chamber had committed errors relating to the indictment, to alibi or in its assessment of evidence on the events at the Nyange parish.
Whether the Trial Chamber had erred in law by failing to rule on the Accused’s authority and/or link to the MRND and by disregarding his lack of motive to commit the crimes he had been convicted for.
Whether the Trial Chamber has committed an error with regard to joint criminal enterprise, as the Prosecution submitted.
Whether the Trial Chamber had committed a discernible error in determining The Accused’s sentence, as both the Accused and the Prosecution alleged.

Specific legal rules and provisions

Articles 6(1), 20(3) and 24 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Rules 41, 50, 66(B), 67(A)(ii)(a), 68, 86(C), 90(F), 95, 101(C), 103(B), 107 and 119 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

Court's holding and analysis

The Chamber found that Kanyarukiga failed to demonstrate violations of his fair trial rights and dismissed his grounds of appeal 32, 33, 70-71 (para. 55). His grounds of appeal 35-42, 44, alleging errors relating to the indictment, were dismissed as well (para. 88).

The Chamber held that the Accused failed to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber erred in concluding that his alibi was not reasonably possibly true and dismissed his grounds of appeal 1-30, 47 (para. 171). The Chamber further held that the Trial Chamber had not erred in its assessment of the evidence. Consequently, the grounds of appeal 31, 45 through 46, 49 -55, 57-58, 61-68 were dismissed (para. 225).

The Chamber held that a conviction for planning does not require a finding of a position of authority. Hence, it dismissed the Accused’s grounds of appeal 59-60 (para. 258-259). The Chamber also dismissed his ground of appeal 48 because motive, as opposed to mens rea, is not an element of any crime (paras 262-263).

The Chamber dismissed the Prosecution’s ground of appeal regarding joint criminal enterprise (para. 268).

The Chamber dismissed both the Accused’s (para. 276) and the Prosecution’s ground of appeal relating to the sentence (para. 284).

In his separate opinion, Judge Pocar noted that clarification by the Appeals Chamber of the Prosecution’s ground of appeal regarding an element of joint criminal enterprise would prevent uncertainty in future cases (para. 1). He addressed the question raised by the Prosecution and found that the Trial Chamber had erred in finding that planning is insufficient to constitute the requisite contribution to a joint criminal enterprise (para. 5 of the separate opinion of Judge Pocar).