Emmanuel Ndindabahizi v. The Prosecutor

Court	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Appeals Chamber), Tanzania
Case number	ICTR-01-71-A
Decision title	Judgement
Decision date	16 January 2007
Parties	Emmanuel Ndindabahizi The Prosecutor
Categories	Crimes against humanity, Genocide
Keywords	crimes against humanity, extermination, genocide, Murder
Links	Judgement

Summary

The Accused, Emmanuel Ndindabahizi, was Minister of Finance of the Interim Government of Rwanda from 9 April 1994 until he left Rwanda on 13 or 14 July 1994.

On 15 July 2004, Trial Chamber I found Ndindabaizi guilty of one count of genocide and two counts of crimes against humanity (extermination and murder) for his role in the events at Gitwa Hill and at the Gaseke roadblock. Ndindabahizi appealed against his convictions and his sentence.

The Appeals Chamber upheld Ndindabahizi's convictions for genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity for his participation in the events at Gitwa Hill in late April 1994 which resulted in the death of thousands of Tutsi. The Chamber reversed the convictions for genocide and murder in relation to the killing of one victim at Gaseke roadblock. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber underlined that Ndindabahizi's criminal responsibility had to be determined according to the entirety of his contribution to the Rwandan genocide. Hence the Chamber unanimously held that his acquittal for the murder of one victim did not diminish the gravity of his actions and it confirmed the life sentence imposed on him.

Procedural history

The amended indictment of 1 September 2003 charged Ndindabahizi with three counts: genocide, extermination and murder as crimes against humanity under Article 6(1) of the Statute. On 15 July 2004, Trial Chamber I found that, on 23 through 24 April 1994, the Accused transported attackers to Gitwa Hill, distributed weapons there and expressly urged the attackers to kill Tutsi people. These acts resulted in the death of thousands of Tutsi. Hence the Trial Chamber convicted the Accused for instigating and aiding and abetting genocide (count 1) pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute, as well as for committing or, alternatively, instigating and aiding and abetting extermination as a crime against humanity at Gitwa Hill (count 2). The Accused was also convicted for instigating and aiding and abetting genocide (count 1) under Article 6(1) and for instigating and aiding and abetting murder as a crime against humanity (count 3) for his role in the events at the Gaseke roadblock in late May 1994. The Trial Chamber sentenced him to life imprisonment.

The Appellant advanced ten grounds of appeal against his convictions and the sentence.

Legally relevant facts

Under sub-ground 1 of appeal, the Accused submitted that the Trial Chamber had erred in relying for its judgment on the vague and defective paragraphs 15 and 20 of the Indictment, which alleged that the attacks at Gitwa Hill had taken place on unknown days between 13 and 26 April 1994 (para. 14).

Under grounds 9 and 10, the Accused claimed that the Trial Chamber had erred in relying on the testimonies of witnesses CGY and CGN to find that he had gone to Gitwa Hill on 23 and 24 April 1994 (para. 24).

Under ground 2, the Accused maintained that the Trial Chamber had erred in law in making factual findings on certain elements not contained in the Indictment (para. 49).

Under ground 4, the Accused contended that the Prosecutor had failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in the possession of the Prosecution since 20 June 2001 (para. 61]).

Under grounds 5 and 3, the Accused submitted that the Trial Chamber had violated his right to fair proceedings in its assessment of defence evidence (para. 74).

The Accused withdrew his sixth, eighth and twelfth grounds of appeal.

Under ground 11, the Accused claimed that the Trial Chamber had erred in finding that he had been at the Gaseke roadblock at the end of May 1994 (para. 106).

Under ground 13, the Accused argued that the Trial Chamber had erred in concluding that the aggravating circumstances had outweighed the mitigating circumstances in his case (para. 124).

Core legal questions

Whether the Appeals Chamber should accept the grounds of appeal submitted by the Accused.
Whether the Trial Chamber had convicted the Accused in the alternative for several modes of liability.
What the effect on the sentence would be, in case any of the grounds of appeal were accepted.

Specific legal rules and provisions

Articles 2, 3, 6(1),(3), 17(4), 20(4) and 24 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Rules 47, 67(A),(B), 68, 92bis, 101(D), 103(B), 107, 115, 118 and 119 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

Court's holding and analysis

The Appeals Chamber rejected the Accused’s first sub-ground of appeal on the grounds that the date range given in the relevant paragraphs of the indictment provided the Accused with enough information on the nature of the charges against him (paras. 22-23). The Chamber also rejected the ninth and tenth grounds of appeal (paras. 26-48).

Regarding the Accused’s second ground of appeal, the Chamber held that the Trial Chamber neither convicted the Accused relying on material facts which were not in the indictment nor were the proceedings against the Accused rendered unfair by the Trial Chamber’s discussion of this evidence (paras. 57-60).

The Chamber rejected the Accused’s fourth ground of appeal on the grounds that the relevant documents did not cast any doubt on the Trial Chamber’s findings unreasonable (paras. 70-73). The Chamber further rejected the fifth and third grounds of appeal (para. 105)

The Chamber granted the Accused’s eleventh ground of appeal underlining that no reasonable trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing of Mr. Nors was a consequence of the Accused’s acts (paras. 117-118).

The Chamber proprio motu considered the issue of alternative convictions for several modes of liability. It found, with Judge Güney dissenting, that the Trial Chamber had not convicted the Accused in the alternative (paras. 121-123).

The Chamber rejected the Accused’s thirteenth ground of appeal concerning his sentence (para. 142).

In his separate opinion, Judge Shahabuddeen did not agree with the majority’s view that the Trial Chamber had erred in considering that Mr. Nors had been killed shortly after the visit by the Accused to the Gaseke roadblock (para. 1).

In his partially dissenting opinion, Judge Güney disagreed with the majority in upholding the Trial Chamber’s finding that, based on the circumstances of this case, the Accused’s conduct constituted the “commission” of extermination (para. 2).