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We often associate genocide with the act of killing members of a specific group, of which there have been many devastating examples throughout history. However, according to the Genocide Convention, other acts can also be regarded as genocide, if they are committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, specific groups. In this case, the plaintiff held that building a bridge to Hindmarsh in South Australia would impede on the culture and way-of-life of the Ngarrindjeri in such a dramatic way that it would lead to the destruction of this group. However, at that point, genocide was not a crime under Australian national law. The plaintiff therefore invoked legislation from the UK, arguing that application of this legislation was possible because of the fact that the UK preceded the current Commonwealth of Australia in governing the Australian continent and its adjacent islands. The judge did not accept this argument and reiterated that even when international law prohibits genocide, someone can only be found guilty of genocide if national legislation explicitly prohibits genocide. The claim was denied.

In 2002, with the adoption of the International Criminal Court Act 2002, genocide became a crime under Australian law.

We often associate genocide with the act of killing members of a specific group, of which there have been many devastating examples throughout history. However, according to the Genocide Convention, other acts can also be regarded as genocide, if they are committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, specific groups. In this case, the plaintiff had already sought (and failed to find) two interlocutory injunctions to prevent a bridge from being built to Hindmarsh in South Australia. It was held that this construction would impede on the culture and way-of-life of the Ngarrindjeri in such a dramatic way that it would lead to the destruction of this group. The judge did not agree that the construction would amount to genocide and reiterated earlier judgments that genocide was not a criminal act under Australian law. Treaties are not a direct source of law in Australia, and neither is customary international law.

In 2002, with the International Criminal Court Act 2002, genocide became a crime under Australian law.

In this case, the plaintiff held that building a bridge to Hindmarsh in South Australia would impede on the culture and way-of-life of the Ngarrindjeri in such a dramatic way that it would lead to the destruction of this group. However, at that point, genocide was not a crime under Australian national law. The plaintiff therefore invoked legislation from the UK, arguing that application of this legislation was possible because of the fact that the UK preceded the current Commonwealth of Australia in governing the Australian continent and its adjacent islands. The judge did not accept this argument and reiterated that even when international law prohibits genocide, someone can only be found guilty of genocide if national legislation explicitly prohibits genocide. The claim was denied. Sumner was unsuccessful in appealing to this judgment. The full chamber of South Australia’s Supreme Court reiterated that the interlocutory appeal to prevent the start of constructing the bridge should be denied, as there was no serious case to be tried. It did so, most importantly, because the ‘underpinning’ of the case, the allegation that building the bridge was in essence a genocidal act, was not substantiated with referral to domestic law.

The village of Kilwa in Katanga province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was the site of combat in October 2004. Having come under the control of rebel forces from Zambia belonging to the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Katanga (MRLK), the troops of the Congolese Army (FARDC) were ordered by President Kabila to regain control over the village. After three hours of heavy shelling on 15 October 2004, the FARDC forces succeeded.

During the take over, it is alleged that they committed acts of pillaging, wanton destruction as well as illegal detentions and summary executions. Some 70 villagers were killed. The present decision was rendered by the Katanga Military Court after proceedings widely described by international observers as unfair and biased by political interferences and procedural irregularities. In its verdict, the Court found the commander in charge of the attack, Adémar Ilunga, and three soldiers guilty for the illegal arrest, detention, and murder of two persons. These crimes, however, were not committed during the attack of Kilwa. All the other accused were acquitted, the Court having concluded the victims were members of a rebel group killed during the attack. The Australian company, Anvil Mining Congo, was also accused, FARDC soldiers having used company property, including a plane, to lead the attack and commit the alleged crimes. However, the Court concluded that the FARDC had requisitioned the vehicles and acquitted Anvil and three of its employees.

During the Vietnam War in the 1960’s, the United States sprayed toxic herbicides in areas of South Vietnam. Herbicides were considered effective in meeting important US and allied military objectives in Vietnam. Vietnamese nationals and a Vietnamese organisation representing the victims of Agent Orange brought a case before US court against several US-registered companies that were deployed by the United States military during the Vietnam War. They claimed to have suffered injuries as a result of their exposure to and contamination by these herbicides.

The Plaintiffs brought the case to court under the Alien Tort Statute, which grants the district courts jurisdiction over any civil action by an alien claiming damages for a tort committed in violation of international law or a treaty of the United States. They also asserted claims grounded in domestic tort law. Plaintiffs sought monetary damages as well as injunctive relief in the form of environmental abatement, clean-up, and disgorgement of profits.

The District court determined that Plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate an alleged violation of international law because Agent Orange (toxic herbicide) was used to protect United States troops against ambush and not as a weapon of war against human populations. On 22 February 2008, the Court of Appeals confirmed this decision.